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This extended essay argues for a new approach towards the writing of constitutional histories of the 
Crown within New Zealand. It looks specifically at the conceptions of the relationship between the 
Treaty of Waitangi, the common law and customary interests that the Crown and its legal advisors 
actually employed in internal deliberation and external positioning. In looking at the processes for 
articulating the Crown's preferred legal position during John Salmond's tenure as Solicitor-
General, this article notes the overwhelming prevalence of statute and Treaty-based conceptions in 
law (as well as areas of historical change and discontinuity). Common law approaches emerged in 
the later twentieth century through newly minted theories or doctrines of aboriginal title but were 
never regarded as distinct options by the historical actors themselves. The concern of this article is 
with how those actors – most notably Salmond – conceived, acted upon and adapted their 
perception of the Crown's constitutional obligations to Māori.  In mapping the course of a Crown 
legal "register" or way of speaking about native title and the Treaty of Waitangi, the essay aims to 
reveal the rich and contested nuances of the approaches assumed by the legal advisors to the Crown 
on the question of the Treaty from 1910 until 1920 and its relevance to a governmental outlook on 
customary property.  
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I INTRODUCTION – AN APPROACH TOWARDS WRITING 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES OF THE CROWN AND THE TREATY OF 
WAITANGI  
I intend to demonstrate that John Salmond as Solicitor-General endeavoured to develop a 
particular form of Crown "register" on the Treaty of Waitangi and "native title" in New Zealand 
through the ordinary courts and internally within government itself. I use the term "register" not in 
the sense of a physical record or volume but that of a particular variety of language, idiom or 
vocabulary: a specific way of seeing and talking about something. It was communicable to others 
both within and outside of the executive government although only the tangible textual traces of it 
remain extant in the record. This article contends that the Crown approach during the tenure of 
Salmond as Solicitor-General from 2 February 1910 until his elevation to the judiciary in May 1920 
was, in essence, a Treaty of Waitangi-centred account of the source of claims to customary property 
rights rather than a theoretical position premised upon or determined by the common law. In these 
circumstances, "native title" was not perceived to be a common law species of right or interest at all. 
It was treated as a class of rights emerging out of the Treaty of Waitangi (initially entered into at 
Waitangi on 6 February 1840). "Rights" expressed in the Treaty were not received as legal rights  
except insofar as they had been accorded discrete recognition in legislation. This was not merely an 
issue of "focus", as one commentator has suggested.1 The legal analysis of advisors to the Crown 
stressed the centrality of the statutory recognition of such potential claims as opposed to the 
possibility of an independently justiciable source in common law. Such a perspective was thought to 
enjoy reasonable sustenance from existing judicial authority, including the advice of the judicial 
committee of the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker.2  
Frame's pioneering account has glimpsed the possibility of this interpretation faintly and en 
passant.3 But, for the Crown Law Office, this approach was sustained via an earnestly held legal 
and theoretical view of the Treaty of Waitangi as a source of political claims to "rights". These 
  
1  The argument presented here is therefore at variance with Professor Alex Frame's assertion in Salmond: 
Southern Jurist (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1995) 126 ("Rather like an Escher drawing, the 
question is one of focus – is one looking at customary rights as the structure on which statute superimposes, 
or is one looking at the statute as the structure whose interstices accommodate customary rights? Salmond's 
position is as modern as Mabo [referring to Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (HCA)]…", a 
point with which I would respectfully beg to differ); and the implication in note 54 of that text, to the effect 
that the late twentieth century approach to the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights was broadly 
comparable to that employed on behalf of the Crown during John Salmond's tenure as Solicitor-General. 
The distinction is subtle but is, nevertheless, critical to appreciating, and historicising, in an accurate 
fashion, the possible legal strategies of the Crown at this time and the policy rationale of the executive, as 
well as the concrete consequences for its official conduct. In this sense, the argument agrees with Richard 
Boast's article in this volume. 
2  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker [1901] AC 561 (PC), 70 LJPC 66. 
3  Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist, above n 1, 126, 127-128 (and note 68). 
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rights were to be expressed in the legal expression of policy preferences promoted by the Crown-in-
Parliament - legislation. This article builds upon (and, in significant respects, occasionally disagrees 
with) Boast's important work,4 as well as that of White,5 but seeks to outline the legal-historical 
nuances of the approach of the Crown and to reveal the pressures placed upon it. In doing so, the 
critical object of this paper is to tease out the reasoning underlying a Crown legal "register" on the 
Treaty of Waitangi internal to government and communicable in litigation or in correspondence to 
those beyond the executive branch, to chart the process of its development together with its 
rationale, and to explore its strategic use. Salmond ought not to be faulted for the theoretical stance 
that he developed. It was a perspective that was at once understandable (albeit admittedly 
contestable) in light of a plausible interpretation of the state of judicial authority within 
New Zealand and informed by a sense of the preferred, if disputed, line of policy coursing through 
native land legislation. The following account reveals a rich vein of dispute and discussion on the 
Treaty of Waitangi in a critical part of New Zealand's legal and constitutional history. It was a 
complicated and occasionally fraught conversation with consequences in legislation and policy well 
into the twentieth century. If this is not appreciated, then much of that history will be misconstrued 
and the significance of the contribution of Paul McHugh and others in the 1980s misunderstood.  
The focus on a "register" or particular form of language and idiomatic expression concerning an 
issue within public law ought not to be restricted to the judicial engagement with executive action in 
litigation or to other external features of governmental behaviour (such as the public statements of 
Ministers). Method in legal history must be subtler than simply analysing the officially reported 
versions of court decisions – the fossilised remnants of complicated and often lively contexts. Much 
of what the Crown does is not the subject of litigation. Much of what passes for public law occurs 
within government. In this vein, the analysis ought to be extended to observable forms of internal 
control, persuasion and behaviour within the executive branch of government, including minutes, 
correspondence and sometimes contestable legal opinion writing and the use of legal theory and 
strategy to co-ordinate (even if unsuccessfully) governmental approaches to certain subjects.6 Law 
  
4  See Richard Boast "The Foreshore" Waitangi Tribunal, Rangahaua Whānui National Theme Q (Waitangi 
Tribunal, Wellington, 1996) 35 et seq. 
5  B White "Inland Waterways: Lakes" Waitangi Tribunal, Rangahaua Whānui National Theme Q (Waitangi 
Tribunal, Wellington, 1998). 
6  As Terence Daintith and Alan Page suggest in their sophisticated contemporary study The Executive in the 
Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999).  "It was 
[J G A] Pocock above all who taught my generation to think of the history of political theory [or of legal 
history I would add] not as a study of allegedly canonical texts, but rather as a more wide-ranging 
investigation of the changing political languages in which societies talk to themselves" (Q Skinner Liberty 
Before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) 105)). Analysis of forms of language 
deployed in practice should be complemented by a "sense of the complex ways in which individuals 
respond to, assimilate and reshape the materials of their intellectual milieux": see J W Burrow A Liberal 
Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), 5. 
Also, J G A Pocock Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago 
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was, of course, a resource that government actively deployed but, even if influential, it need not 
have been determinative in any given instance of policy-formulation.  
II CLAIMING IN CUSTOM – "NATIVE TITLE IS NOT IN ITSELF ENTITLED 
TO LEGAL RECOGNITION" 
Under Salmond, the attempt to produce a persuasive Crown register or way of seeing and 
talking about the Treaty of Waitangi and what was referred to, variously, as "native title" or "rights 
of native ownership" proved somewhat chimerical at least in the courts if not within government. 
Internally the behaviour of departments might not necessarily accord with this preferred legal stance 
but it could supply the impression of legal unity to external audiences, such as the courts, through 
the consistent legal representation of the Crown Law Office. In this article, I suggest that the 
impression of legal unity and continuity, casually assumed as real, needs to be unpacked with care. 
The faultlines and discontinuities in, or changes to, the Crown's legal-policy approaches over time 
need to be explored. Within the Crown Law Office, Salmond principally enjoyed the assistance of 
two Assistant Law Officers (who might describe themselves as "Crown solicitors") namely Hubert 
Ostler and E Redward.7 Also invited to contribute on occasion were Crown solicitors based in 
various local or regional centres. Notably, Salmond's approach to seeking judicial recognition of an 
internally consistent and coherent Crown theory on these issues succeeded in the Supreme Court in 
Waipapakura v Hempton8 in regards to Māori fishing rights, but failed in Tamihana Korokai v 
Solicitor-General9 in respect of lakes. Both of these cases would represent waypoints for the 
Crown's preferred legal stance during the remainder of Salmond's period of service as Solicitor-
General. In addition, as will be explored in the final section of this essay, that legal approach would 
persevere politically and ultimately, find statutory expression in 1922, as a result of a political out-
of-court settlement over fourteen of the so-called "Rotorua district" or "Arawa district" lakes in the 
central North Island of New Zealand.  
Salmond's underlying conception of customary tenure was that it derived from the Treaty of 
Waitangi and had no independent source of recognition or existence in common law. Its legal 
recognition occurred via statute, as the Treaty obligations were political or moral claims upon the 
Crown. This was most cogently expressed as a general proposition in legal advice in 1917. Writing 
  
University Press, Chicago, 1989) 23-30; J Tully (ed) Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988); Q Skinner "Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech 
Acts" in Skinner Visions of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2002) 103-127.  
7  The title "Crown counsel" was not yet used. 
8  Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (Full Court of the Supreme Court). 
9  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 32 NZLR 321 (CA). 
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to the Under-secretary of Lands, Thomas N Brodrick,10 on the question of Māori customary tenure 
in submerged land, Salmond explained that, "[n]ative customary title depends for its legal existence 
on the Treaty of Waitangi as recognized and validated as a ground of legal title by the successive 
Acts dealing with Native land."11 While counsel in the Law Drafting Office in 1909 Salmond 
conceived the nature of property rights claims in custom as "merely a moral claim, dependent upon 
the good will of the Crown, and not recognizable or enforceable at law".12 In 1910 a substantially 
altered version of Salmond's explanatory memorandum initially prepared to accompany the Native 
Land Bill in 1909 was printed with a published version of the Native Land Act 1909. This later 
memorandum of 1910, issued by Salmond in his capacity as Solicitor-General, described customary 
land as follows: "As against the Crown it is not a legal title at all, but a mere moral claim under the 
Treaty of Waitangi to obtain a Crown grant".13 Thus, importantly, "native title" was not received as 
a common law species of right at all. Elsewhere within that particular explanatory note, Salmond 
would characterize "customary land" as "land in respect of which the ancient customary Native title, 
as recognized and guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi, has not yet been extinguished".14 He 
elaborated that, "[s]uch land, since it has not been Crown-granted, remains vested in the Crown, 
subject, however, to the customary title of the Natives and to their right to have the customary title 
transformed into a freehold title by the Native Land Court".15 "Native title is not in itself entitled to 
legal recognition", went the Crown Law Office argument prepared for the Native Land Court 
hearing in the Rotorua Lakes case.16  
  
10  Thomas Noel Brodrick (1855-1931) became Under-secretary of Lands in 1915: see Ashley Gould, "Thomas 
Noel Brodrick" in The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography: Volume III – 1901-1920 (Auckland 
University Press and Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1996) 68-69. 
11  Salmond, Solicitor-General, to Under-secretary of Lands (11 June 1917) Crown Law [Office] ("CL") 174/2, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.  
12  Salmond "Native Land Bill [1909]: Memorandum. Notes on the History of Native-land Legislation", 
Number 87-3, Bill Books, 1909, 1, Parliamentary Counsel Office, Wellington ["Native Land Bill (1909)"]. 
David V Williams of the University of Auckland located an unprinted typescript of this memorandum in the 
University of Auckland library (NZGC 333.099517), which has been published in appendix C of H Bassett, 
R Steel and David V Williams Māori Land Legislation Manual (Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Wellington, 
1994).  
13  "The Native Land Act, 1909 – Introduction (Memorandum by the Solicitor-General)" in The Native Land 
Act, 1909, with Explanatory Memorandum, Index to Act, Rules of Court, Regulations, Orders in Council 
defining Districts, etc (issued by the direction of the Hon James Carroll, Native Minister) (John MacKay, 
Government Printer, Wellington, 1910) xi. 
14  Ibid, ix. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Crown Law Office argument Rotorua Case undated, 1918(?) 6, CL174/2 Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
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III SALMOND AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF NATIVE TITLE AGAINST 
THE CROWN – SALMOND'S OUTLOOK IN 1909 
This sort of analysis coincided with the plausible response of Salmond to the advice of the 
judicial committee of the Privy Council in 1901 in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker.17 In 1909 Salmond 
queried the effect of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker on the place of customary interests at law. "Whether 
by virtue of [the] legislative recognition [the right of Māori to their customary lands under the 
Treaty of Waitangi] has now become a legal right enforceable against the Crown has never been 
decided, and was left an open question by the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker".18 This 
observation of Salmond in the explanatory note was subtle, as the question of legal enforceability 
that he was ruminating on amounted to whether the customary title already acknowledged statutorily 
could be pursued in the courts against the Crown per se, as opposed to distinct or identifiable 
servants of the Crown acting in accordance with assumed statutory authority. In this particular 
sense, the perceived doubtfulness as to the enforceability of statutorily-recognised customary land 
against the Crown ("His Majesty the King") was resolved through a policy preference in the form of 
section 84 of the Native Land Act 1909. Section 84 said that, "Save so far as otherwise expressly 
provided in any other Act the Native customary title to land shall not be available or enforceable 
against His Majesty the King by any proceedings in any Court or in any other matter." This critical 
point concerning Salmond's view of the legal situation in 1909 ought not to be overlooked although 
certain scholars have sought to imagine a rather broad disjunction between the official stance of 
Salmond on native title and underlying custom and that of their Lordships in Nireaha Tamaki v 
Baker.19 In that case on appeal, Lord Davey, in referring to section 2 of the Land Claims Ordinance 
of 1841, observed that this instrument of the legislative council had not conferred title on the Crown 
but had declared the title of the Crown in "all unappropriated lands" within the colony of 
New Zealand, to be subject to the "right and necessary occupation and use thereof by the aboriginal 
inhabitants of the said Colony".20 Yet, crucially, such recognition in an ordinance "would not of 
  
17  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2. 
18  Salmond "Native Land Bill [1909]", above n 12. Incidentally, the version in the Bill Books referred to as 
87-1 features a handwritten marginal note of unknown authorship against the passage cited here stating: 
"But see Te HeuHeu v Aotea 1941 NZLR" (referring to the important advice of the Judicial Committeee of 
the Privy Council in Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Land Board [1941] AC 308 (PC); [1941] 
NZLR 590 (PC)). See Alex Frame "Hoani Te Heuheu's Case in London 1940-1941: An Explosive Story" 
(2006) 22 NZULR 148. 
19  On this count, for instance, the analysis here departs from David V Williams "Fame and Infamy – A Tale of 
Two Men of the Law in Colonial New Zealand" in H Foster and B Berger (eds) History's Living Legacy: 
Essays on Colonial Legal Culture in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (University of British Columbia 
Press, Vancouver, forthcoming) and David V Williams "Wi Parata is Dead, Long Live Wi Parata" in A 
Erueti and C Charters (eds) Maori Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2007) 37-39. 
20  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2, 567 Lord Davey. 
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itself … be sufficient to create a right in the native occupiers cognizable in a Court of Law".21 The 
speech of Lord Davey then traversed the range of native land legislation, together with the five 
sections of the brief Native Rights Act 1865.22 These were important, in that a role for the courts on 
the issue of native title was directly engaged via statute. As his Lordship appreciated, section 5 of 
the Native Rights Act 1865 provided that:  
In any action in which the title to or any interest in any such land is involved the Judge before whom the 
same shall be tried shall order that any issue or issues in such action in which such title or interest is 
involved whether they be issues of fact or of Maori Custom or Usage shall be tried in the Native Lands 
Court and the Judge of the Native Lands Court before whom the same shall be tried shall return the 
verdict or judgment as the case may be into the Supreme Court and such verdict or judgment shall be 
taken as conclusive both as to fact and as to the Maori Custom or Usage and shall be dealt with by the 
Supreme Court in the same manner and shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury in the Supreme 
Court. 
In disagreeing with the reasoning of the Chief Justice, James Prendergast, in the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington,23 that there was no Māori customary law of 
which an ordinary court of law could take cognisance, the judicial committee carefully referred to 
section 5 of the Native Rights Act 1865. Lord Davey perceived that provision as plainly 
contemplating that cases might arise in which a court of inherent jurisdiction – the Supreme Court – 
would have to consider the relevant title or interest in native land. In such a situation, as Lord Davey 
acknowledged, the Supreme Court judge was obliged to remit any such issue to the Native Land 
Court.24 The Native Land Court's "verdict or judgment" would be "taken as conclusive both as to 
fact and as to the Maori Custom or Usage". Thus, Lord Davey advised that, "[i]f necessary for the 
ascertainment of the appellant's alleged rights, the Supreme Court must seek the assistance of the 
Native Land Court; but that circumstance does not appear to their Lordships an objection to the 
Supreme Court entertaining the appellant's action".25 It was admitted, then, that the Native Land 
Court, a creature of statute in itself, had been accorded the exclusive legislative authority to 
investigate customary interests in land.  
  
21  Ibid (emphasis added). 
22  Native Rights Act 1865, 29 Vict, c 11 (26 September 1865) (NZ). Its long title reads: "An Act to declare 
that the Māoris shall be deemed to be natural-born subjects of Her Majesty and to declare that the 
jurisdiction of the Queen's Courts of Law extends over the persons and properties of all Her Majesty's 
subjects within the Colony". 
23  Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72.  
24  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2, 577 Lord Davey. 
25  Ibid, 578. 
860 (2007) 38 VUWLR 
The Privy Council saw no basis for doubting the correctness of the decision in Wi Parata v 
Bishop of Wellington (Wi Parata) on the fine but significant legal point that the Supreme Court had 
no jurisdiction by a writ of scire facias or any other proceeding to annul a Crown grant for any 
matter not appearing on the face of the grant.  It also agreed that the issue of a Crown grant implied 
a declaration on the part of the Crown that the customary native title had been extinguished at 
law.26 That said, such a legal conclusion suggested that, "it [was] all the more important that natives 
should be able to protect their rights (whatever they are) before the land is sold and granted to a 
purchaser" pursuant to statutory authorisation under the Land Act 1892.27 Section 136 of the Land 
Act 1892 outlined a process for offering up so-called "rural lands" for sale.28 The information 
before the Judicial Committee indicated that the Native Land Court had already investigated and 
ascertained the title of the appellant amongst others to the Mangatainoka block, and issued an order 
dated 13 September 1871 pursuant to the Native Lands Act of 1865.29 On 13 July 1893 the 
respondent by public notice offered a parcel of land named Kaiparoro, comprising some 20,000 
acres, containing parts of two blocks referred to as Kaihinu No 1 and Kaihinu No 2, as well as a 
disputed area of 5,184 acres, the title to which was subject to contest in the action under appeal to 
the judicial committee of the Privy Council. There was a contest as to whether the 5,184 acres at 
issue formed part of the Mangatainoka block or were included within the otherwise adjacent 
Kaihinu No 2 block. The Law Lords expressed "no opinion on the question which was mooted in 
the course of argument, whether the native title could be extinguished by the exercise of the 
prerogative, which does not arise in the present case".30 
 
The judicial committee was, nevertheless, cautious as to whether the appellant could not sue 
upon his asserted native title against the "Crown itself"31 as opposed to the respondent, the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands in the Wellington district (Mr Baker). It was this non-committal 
 
26  Ibid, 579. In that passage, while acknowledging that the obiter dicta in Wi Parata proceeded beyond what 
was necessary to that specific decision, Lord Davey continued that, "their Lordships have already 
commented on the limited construction and effect attributed to the 3rd section of the Native Rights Act, 
1865, by the Chief Justice in [Wi Parata]. As applied to the case then before the Court, however, their 
Lordships see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the learned judges" 
(emphasis added). 
27  Ibid. 
28  Section 136 of the Land Act 1892 stated that, "The Governor may from time to time, by notification in the 
Gazette, declare that any rural land within the colony, including land now open for selection, but not being 
lands now or hereafter to be open under Parts V or VI of this Act, shall be open for sale or selection in the 
manner and upon the conditions mentioned in this Part of this Act. Before gazetting any such notification 
the Governor shall require the Surveyor-General to report upon the nature, class, and value of such land."  
29  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2, 571 Lord Davey. 
30  Ibid, 580. 
31  Ibid, 578. 
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caution that explains Salmond's interpretation of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker. "[T]here may be 
difficulties in [the] way [of the appellant relying on native title] (whether insurmountable or not it 
[was] unnecessary to say); but for the reasons already given that question, in the opinion of their 
Lordships, does not arise in the present case".32 In short, Lord Davey had already concluded that a 
suit could be brought against the respondent party, the Commissioner of Crown Lands in the 
Wellington district, as the "respondent's authority to sell on behalf of the Crown was derived solely 
from the statutes [including the Land Act 1892], and is confined within the four corners of the 
statutes".33 A servant of the Crown (not the Crown per se) had performed the act complained of. In 
these circumstances, the "fallacy of the judges of the Court of Appeal in New Zealand", indicated 
Lord Davey, was "to treat the respondent as if he were the Crown, or acting under the authority of 
the Crown for the purpose of this action".34 In this sense, the judicial committee was pronouncing 
on a principle that had acquired acceptance within the United Kingdom. Thus, while the orthodox 
viewpoint that the Crown in the person of the monarch could do no wrong still held sway, it was 
increasingly accepted that a servant of the Crown could be legally liable for an act.35 A leading text 
on proceedings by and against the Crown published in 1908 would refer to the advice of the Judicial 
Committee in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker as an additional, illustrative authority for this developing 
legal principle.36 The reported submissions on behalf of the appellant in Tamaki emphasized that 
the question on appeal was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to determine the legality of 
the acts of the respondent, specifically whether they were duly authorised by section 136 and 137 of 
  
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid, 595 (emphasis added). For an interesting albeit brief overview of the judiciary and the Crown in the 
United Kingdom at this time, see R Stevens "Government and the Judiciary" in Vernon Bogdanor (ed) The 
British Constitution in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press for the British Academy, Oxford, 
2003) 335-338; and J Jowell "Administrative Law" ibid, 374-376.  
34  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2, 575 Lord Davey. 
35  The Judicial Committee cited Musgrave v Pulido (1879) 5 App Cas 102 and Tobin v Regina (1864) 16 CB 
(NS) 310. For current discussions of Crown immunity and Ministerial or official non-immunity, see Sir 
William Wade "The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability", and other contributions in 
Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds) The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
36  See George Stuart Robertson The Law and Practice of Civil Proceedings By and Against the Crown and 
Departments of the Government with Numerous Forms and Precedents (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 
1908) 10, 639. "'The authority of the Crown' as used in this proposition, includes also the authority of any 
Government Department or official to whom the Crown has deputed its powers in that behalf … See also 
Rogers v Rajendro Dutt (1860) 13 Moo PC 209; and Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, [1901] AC 561, 575; 70 
LJPC 66" (Robertson, 639). Also, "It must be remembered that 'it is for the officers of the Crown to make 
out clearly the prerogative, in any case where they claim to be on a different footing from the subject as 
regards procedure in any litigation' (Attorney-General to the Prince of Wales v Crossman, (1866) LR 1 Ex 
381, 386; 4 H & C 568, 575; 35 LJ Ex 215. See also Nireaha Tamaki v Baker [1901] AC 561, 575; 70 LJPC 
66" (Robertson, 10).  
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the Land Act 1892.37 The judicial committee answered that submission in the affirmative. 
Accordingly, when the matter of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General materialised in 1910 in the 
wake of the enactment of the Native Land Act 1909, Salmond was alive to the possibility of the 
action raising "the question left undecided by the Privy Council in Nireaha [sic Tamaki] v Baker, 
whether the Native title is available or enforceable against the Crown".38 He was also acutely aware 
that statutes did not bind the Crown unless they expressly said so. As will be seen in the next 
section, he would be disappointed. Nevertheless, the legislative source for legal recognition was 
tightly woven into a view that the Native Land Court, a creature of statute itself, was the proper 
repository for the hearing of native title claims. 
 
IV PRESENTING A CROWN APPROACH ON THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
AND NATIVE TITLE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (1912) AND SUPREME 
COURT (1914) 
In Tamihana Korokai in 1912 the Court of Appeal in Wellington merely held in a case-stated 
proceeding, that it was the duty of the Native Land Court to hear and adjudicate a claim to Māori 
customary proprietorship to the bed of Lake Rotorua. Conversely, Māori had the correlative right to 
make an application to the Native Land Court for the investigation and ascertainment of title to 
customary land pursuant to section 90 of the Native Land Act 1909. The term "customary land" in 
section 2 of the Native Land Act 1909 denoted "land which, being vested in the Crown, is held by 
Natives or the descendants of Natives under the customs and usages of the Māori people".39 The 
solicitors for the plaintiff were the legal firm of Earl and Kent in Auckland. The agent for these 
solicitors was the firm of Chapman, Skerrett, Wylie and Tripp in Wellington. Salmond and Ostler 
represented the Crown. Judgment on the case stated was delivered in the Court of Appeal on 
7 October 1912. "I am of [the] opinion", said the Chief Justice, Sir Robert Stout, "that the Native 
Land Act recognizes that Natives have a right to their customary titles."40 In December 1909 the 
litigation was initially brought by way of ordinary statement of claim in the Supreme Court 
(Northern District). Eventually it proceeded under rule 245 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a 
special case stated basis with a view to inviting the court to pronounce on questions of law agreed 
amongst the parties that might, in effect, render the need for subsequent legal and evidential findings 
 
37  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, ibid, 564 Lord Davey.  
38  Salmond, Solicitor-General, to J A Tole, Crown Solicitor, Auckland (5 February 1910) Crown Law Office 
Case 84. 
39  John William Tate has closely explored the text of the judicial opinions in Tamihana Korokai v 
Solicitor-General in his survey "Tamihana Korokai and Native Title: Healing the Imperial Breach" (2005) 
13 Waikato LR 103 ["Tamihana Korokai and Native Title"]. Yet I explore the context of this decision in 
detail by reference to the Crown Law Office proceedings and correspondence file, as well as the subsequent 
litigation in Waipapakura v Hempton and in the Native Land Court, and consider the Crown stance on the 
Treaty of Waitangi and native title. 
40  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 345. 
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irrelevant. In other words, it might obviate the need for the litigation to proceed to the judicial phase 
at first instance in the wake of a ruling on certain generic legal questions.41 Thus, a number of 
discrete questions were posed by way of consent between the parties. The case stated also included a 
number of agreed positions of fact. For instance, it was agreed that Lake Rotorua was approximately 
seven and a half miles in length and six miles in breadth. In addition, it was agreed that Lake 
Rotorua was "navigable throughout the greater part of its extent, the larger part being between forty 
feet and eighty feet in depth".  
Delving into the papers for the case stated reveals the shape of Salmond's outlook in 1912. A 
key query was presented as paragraph 26(b) of the special case stated. It asked "whether the bed of 
the Lake [was] Native customary land in respect of which a freehold order can be made by the 
Native Land Court". The succinct handwritten comment of Salmond appearing in the margin of the 
Crown Law Office's copy of the document simply stated "no jurisdiction to determine".42 On this 
score, Salmond's argument as to the lack of jurisdiction of the Native Land Court failed in the Court 
of Appeal. 
Several questions in the special case directly raised the possibility that the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction itself to entertain claims of "Native customary land" against the Crown. Salmond's 
response revealed disagreement with the possibility of action in the ordinary courts on native title 
interests in land. He recorded a "no" against paragraph 26(e): "Is Native customary title a ground on 
which any action can be instituted in this Court, whether for a declaration of title or for any other 
relief?" This rather assured and straightforward negative response in 1912 was apparently at 
variance with the implication (it is little more than that) from correspondence of 23 December 1909 
that Salmond had forwarded to Charles Skerrett KC, a partner in the legal firm Chapman, Skerrett, 
  
41  This resort to a case stated procedure would be an approach that the Crown would agree, in conjunction 
with other litigant parties, in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2002] 2 NZLR 661 (HC); Attorney-General v 
Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA), the proceedings in which the first two questions of law posed were as 
follows: "What is the extent of the Māori Land Court's jurisdiction under Te Ture Whenua Māori Act [1993 
(the Māori land legislation)] to determine the status of foreshore and seabed and the waters related thereto?" 
and "Does the law of New Zealand recognise any Māori customary title to all or any part of the foreshore?" 
It was also deployed In re an Application for Investigation of Title to the Ninety Mile Beach (Wharo Oneroa 
a Tohe) [1960] NZLR 673 (SC), dealt with on appeal in In re the Ninety-Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 
(CA). The first question in the case stated in Re an Application for Investigation of Title to the Ninety Mile 
Beach (Wharo Oneroa a Tohe) was: "Does the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court conferred by Section 
161 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 to investigate the title to customary land and to issue freehold orders in 
respect thereof extend to the investigation of title to and the issue of freehold orders in respect of land lying 
between mean high water mark and mean low water mark, which was at the time of the cession of 
New Zealand to Her Majesty the Queen under the Treaty of Waitangi owned and occupied by Maoris 
according to their customs and usages?" 
42  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General "Special case stated pursuant to Rule 245" 13, Crown Law Office 
Case 84, Wellington. 
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Wylie and Tripp in Wellington.43 There was, however, some subtlety to the legal stance of the 
Crown. Salmond's letter conveyed the undertaking of James Carroll, the Native Minister in the 
Liberal Ministry of Joseph Ward, James Carroll, on behalf of that government that the Crown would 
not use what ultimately became section 84 of the Native Land Act 1909 to "raise any objection to 
the determination by the Supreme Court of the questions to which you refer, so long as you ask for 
nothing more than a declaration as to the legal position of the lands in question".44 This was clearly 
premised on the view that the sought-after "declaration" would accord no substantive immediate 
relief enforceable at law against the Crown or other parties. That enforceability (as opposed to the 
cognisability of native title) would arise once the Native Land Court investigated the title and issued 
orders, if any. Skerrett's letter of 22 December 1909, anticipating the imminent passage of the 
Native Land Bill 1909, had foreshadowed this sort of response as a result of meeting Salmond.45 
Although Skerrett entertained some personal doubt whether clause 84 would have the desired effect, 
he recognised Salmond's advice that it was too late in the legislative track of the Bill to secure any 
amendments. Salmond, still counsel to the Law Drafting Office at this stage, also advised Skerrett 
that in the event of the Supreme Court deciding that "Native customary title exists in respect of 
those lands, it will then be for the Government to decide in its discretion whether it will allow 
proceedings for the issue of freehold orders to be instituted in the Native Land Act".46 He added 
that, "if such proceedings are prohibited under Clause 100, the matter will become one for 
legislation instead of for the law Courts".47 The solicitors for the plaintiff were certainly on notice 
that resort to legislation was within the contemplation of the Government, were the Supreme Court 
to decide that "the Native customary title exists in respect of those lands".48 The Crown would then 
consider whether to prevent the Native Land Court from entertaining proceedings for the issue of 
freehold orders. The member of the House of Representatives for the Eastern Maori electorate, 
  
43  Once appointed, King's Counsel were permitted to continue practice as solicitors at this time. Refer to the 
biographical note for Charles Skerrett by Barton in The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, above n 10, 
476.  
44  Salmond, Law Drafting Office, to Charles Skerrett (23 December 1909) Crown Law Office Case 84A, 
Wellington. 
45  Skerrett to Salmond (22 December 1909) AAMK 869, box 84b 5/13/242, pt 4, Arawa Lakes 1904-1925, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington: "I quite recognise the position and desire to place on record what was 
intended to be effected by … clause [84] so that the Counsel for the Crown may be instructed not to take up 
the position, in the cases in which I am interested, that there is any objection to the Supreme Court declaring 
the existence of a customary right if it is not sought to actively enforce that right against the Crown." 
46  Salmond to Skerrett (23 December 1909) Crown Law Office Case 84A, Wellington. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
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Āpirana Ngata, received a comparable assurance.49 Frame has commented on this communication 
in some detail.50 
 
In answer to paragraph 26(f) of the special case stated – "What remedy have the Natives in 
respect of their rights preserved by the Treaty of Waitangi [?]" – Salmond's handwritten note in the 
margin read "in the Native Land Court – freehold order". On the position he had taken on paragraph 
26(f) of the special case stated, Salmond implicitly received a favourable response from the Court of 
Appeal in Tamihana Korokai. The Court of Appeal held that the Native Land Court was the proper 
forum for the consideration of native title in land. Yet, critically from his overall strategic and case 
management perspective, he failed to obtain a declaration from the ordinary courts to the effect that 
the beds of non-tidal inland navigable waters were beyond the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court. 
He did not manage to convey the fine subtlety of that position in his oral submissions, faltering on a 
bald argument as to the ability of the Crown to assert conclusively that the relevant land was Crown 
land not subject to customary title. On this basis, any such argument would have to occur in the 
Native Land Court should the litigation continue. After all, section 90 of the Native Land Act 1909 
read that, "The Native Land Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate the title to 
customary land, and to determine the relative interests of the owners thereof." This was the practical 
significance of Salmond's loss. The Crown legal approach was confronted with the prospect of not 
readily containable litigation in a specialist court on "native land". 
The special case stated proceeding was removed form the Supreme Court into the Court of 
Appeal by an order of Justice Edwards dated 10 July 1912. Salmond's predecessor as Solicitor-
General, Frederick Fitchett, suggested resorting to one of the proceedings as a "test case" in January 
1910 in the wake of having been served on 22 December 1909 with the identical writs of summons 
and statements of claim in both Tamihana Korokai (as it was initially framed)51 and Tieri te Tikao v 
Attorney-General (regarding Lake Rotoiti).52 In the subsequent month, Salmond considered that the 
appropriate course would be to proceed by a special case stated process in one of the actions, whilst 
 
49  See Salmond to Ngata (22 December 1909) AAMK 869, box 84b, 5/13/242, pt 4, Arawa Lakes 1904-1925, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.  
50  Frame Southern Jurist, above n 1, 115. 
51  The full intituling in the documents on the Crown Law Office litigation file (Case 84) described the parties 
as follows: "Tamahana [sic] Korokai of Rotorua, New Zealand Aboriginal Native on behalf of himself and 
other Natives who are the owners according to Native custom and otherwise of the land covered by the 
water known as 'Lake Rotorua' (plaintiffs) and The Honourable the Attorney-General (defendant)". But for 
the change in the identity of the defendant party, the description of the parties was identical in the Court of 
Appeal. 
52  Fitchett, Solicitor-General, to Joseph Augustus Tole, Crown Solicitor, Auckland (11 January 1910) Crown 
Law Office Case 84A, Wellington. 
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deferring the other.53 In that correspondence with the Crown Solicitor in Auckland, Salmond 
proposed a number of possible issues of law, such as whether the "Native title extends to the bed of 
lakes such as Rotorua and Rotoiti" and whether the "grant of freehold titles to the adjoining land 
carries with it a grant of the bed or any part thereof".54 In addition, Salmond recommended a 
specific question addressing rights of fishing: "whether the Native owners of the adjoining land have 
any exclusive rights of fishing or other user".55  Joseph Tole, the Crown Solicitor, reported on 
8 March 1910 that Frederick Earl of the legal firm Earl and Kent in Auckland, the solicitor for the 
two plaintiffs, Tamihana Korokai and Tieri Te Tikao respectively, had consented to the proposal of 
stating a special case for consideration in the Court of Appeal.56 On account of the office of 
Attorney-General falling vacant at or near the critical time of the anticipated fixture in the courts, 
the description of the defendant party was eventually amended to read Solicitor-General by order of 
the Supreme Court (27 June 1912). By consent of the parties, the Tieri Te Tikao v Attorney-General 
case did not proceed, as its statement of claim in respect of Lake Rotoiti was essentially identical to 
that in Tamihana Korokai.  
Certain elite members of particular Te Arawa hapū were certainly aware of the testing of the 
issue of the proprietorship of the two lakes in judicial proceedings. Henry Taiporutu ("Tai") Te 
Mapu-o-te-rangi Mitchell, of Ngāti Pikiao, for one, was cautious in adding his support to those 
advocating the repeal of the Thermal Springs District Act 188157 at a meeting at Ohinemutu on 
25 May 1910. He commented that while "most of the Arawa hapus favour the repeal of the 
[Thermal Springs] Act – [the] only reason for keeping it was the doubt whether the testing of the 
Lake Question would be prejudiced".58 The litigation had been in the planning for some time with 
the parliamentarian, Āpirana Ngata, advising Gilbert Mair in April 1909 that the "question of the 
ownership of the lakes is being brought to a head, for I learn that the matter has been placed in the 
good hands of Mr Earl and Mr Skerrett, and that the various tribes interested are getting together a 
  
53  Salmond, Solicitor-General, to J A Tole, Crown Solicitor, Auckland (5 February 1910) Crown Law Office 
Case 84, Wellington. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  J A Tole, Crown Solicitor, Auckland, to Salmond, Solicitor-General (8 March 1910) Crown Law Office 
Case 84. 
57  The Thermal Springs Act 1881, 45 Vict, number 20, 24 September 1881, was an "Act to provide for the 
settlement of the Thermal-Springs Districts of the Colony". Section 2 authorized the Governor to issue 
"Proclamations from time to time defining districts of the colony to be subject to this Act, being localities in 
which there are considerable numbers of ngawha, waiariki, or hot or mineral springs, lakes, rivers, or 
waters, and [to] from time to time … vary the boundaries or abolish any of such districts". 
58  Minutes of meeting, Tamatekapua, Ohinemutu (25 May 1910) AAMK, 869/84b, 5/13/242-1, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington. 
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fund for legal expenses".59 Subsequently in June, Mair recorded that he presided over a meeting of 
"delegates of Te Arawa hapu" with the purpose of raising funds "to test their rights to the lakes".60 
In 1909 Ngata, a member of the Executive Council of Joseph Ward's government, was himself 
under some pressure from Mitchell, especially with the Native Land Bill before the House of 
Representatives. Mitchell, an official in the Auckland district office of the Department of Lands, 
considered Part IV of the Native Land Bill, which contained clauses 84 and 100, to be objectionable. 
In November 1909 he noted that, as the Native Land Bill would affect "Taupo Lake which is outside 
the Thermal Springs Act", he could not "see how we are to accept with honour Ngati Tuwharetoas 
[sic] contribution of £100 [to the litigation fund]".61 Writing to Ngata he said that the "feeling is 
abroad that as a member of [t]he Executive Part IV has your approval & any attempt to delete these 
clauses is futile seeing the attitude you have taken up as evidenced by the proposed new 
legislation".62 Mitchell said, "[p]ersonally I have very little confidence in petition [to the House of 
Representatives] when apparently both you & [the Native Minister, James] Caroll [sic] in 
conjunction with other members of the Executive are for the Bill".63 Stating that the "Lake 
question" was a "vital one to the Arawa people", Mitchell said, "[y]ou have actually supported the 
movement of bringing the matter before the proper authorities for investigation & now this whole 
thing is to be squashed a la back door fashion & our rights over customy [sic] lands guaranteed by a 
solemn Treaty are to be con[fisc]ated without compensation."64 These approaches hastened the 
seeking of undertakings from Government not to use clause 84 of the Native Land Bill once it was 
passed. Subsequently, the Native Minister in the Reform Party government of William Ferguson 
Massey, William Herries, had signalled in the House of Representatives in response to a 
parliamentary question from Ngata, that "any undertaking given by the previous Native Ministers on 
this question [the Rotorua Lake case] will be duly observed".65 There was an evident political 
  
59  Ngata to Gilbert Mair (7 April 1909) Ms-Papers-0148-074, Alexander Turnbull Library ("ATL") 
Wellington. 
60  Gilbert Mair, diary (4 June 1909) Gilbert Mair papers – Ms-papers-0092, folder 61, ATL, Wellington. 
61  Mitchell to Ngata, telegram, 19 November 1909, AAMK 869, box 84b, 5/13/242, pt 4, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington. 
62  Mitchell to Ngata (22 November 1909) AAMK 869, box 84b, 5/13/242, pt 4, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. The correspondence was written on the letterhead paper of the Department of Lands and 
Survey. In the House of Representatives in 1914, Ngata quoted from the correspondence of Te Heuheu 
Tukino of Tūwhareota, which said: "When the Arawas set up their claims to ownership of Lake Rotorua I 
asked my people to contribute to the expenses of the case, which proceeded under the Treaty of Waitangi". 
(3 November 1914) 173 NZPD 783. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  The parliamentary question and answer appears in the Department of Native Affairs file as a typescript 
document, "Extract from Parliamentary Debates, vol 158, page 845 of 1912", MA1 W2459, box 49, 
5/13/242, pt 4 (1911-1925), Lake Rotorua, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.  
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context to the litigation. The executive branch – a complex aspect of government in itself – 
voluntarily constrained its range of legal options as a matter of policy. 
On hearing the submissions from 23 July 1912 until 25 July 1912, the appellate court held in its 
reserved judgment of 7 October 1912 that the Native Land Court could "only be prevented from 
performing its statutory duty, first, under the Native Land Act; or, second, on proof in that court that 
the lands are Crown lands freed of the customary title of the Natives; or, third, that there is a Crown 
title to the bed of the lake".66 In writing this passage, Stout had not explained how "Crown title" 
might emerge. Yet, the third option indicated that such a title might exist ab initio from the assertion 
of the Crown's sovereignty and in contradistinction to those lands of the Crown obtained legally and 
beneficially through the extinguishment of pre-existing "customary land". Thus, the second and 
third options suggested two distinctive routes or possibilities for the existence of a Crown title. The 
second option implied some form of extinguishment, for instance, of pre-existing customary land 
status before an unqualified Crown title could materialise. The third option could be interpreted as 
connoting pre-existing Crown title not subject to customary title since the accession of sovereignty 
in 1840. On the possible range of options, the amended statement of defence initially filed on behalf 
of the Solicitor-General in the Tamihana Korokai proceedings before the Supreme Court was 
unequivocal. Paragraph 16 of that amended statement of defence stated that the "bed of Lake 
Rotorua is Crown Land which is and always has been free from Native Customary title". The 
alternative possibility of extinguishment or abandonment of the customary title, if any, having 
occurred was also pleaded in the amended statement of defence.67 The latter pleading averred that, 
"For many years the lake has been openly and continuously used as a right by the Crown and the 
public as a highway subject to a public right of navigation, and as a public fishery and place of 
public recreation, without any claim of exclusive use or ownership being made by the Natives, and 
the Native customary title, if any such title ever existed, has been therefore lost by implied cession 
surrender or abandonment."68 It is partly for the existence of the second and third options above that 
the Crown Law Office was not prepared to concede that Lake Rotorua was, as a matter of either fact 
or of law, Māori "customary land" within the meaning of the Native Land Act 1909.69 
  
66  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 345-346 Sir Robert Stout, CJ. Chief Justice Stout would 
repeat this passage as the finding of the Court of Appeal when presenting the decision of the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court in Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 8, 1070. Sir Robert Stout's diary entries are terse on 
the case.  For instance, the entry for Tuesday, 23 July 1912 simply reads: "In appeal Court re Rotorua Lake 
case" (Ms-20262-2064, ATL). 
67  Paras 20-21. 
68  Amended statement of defence, in the "Special Case Stated Pursuant to Rule 245", 8, Crown Law Office 
Case 84. 
69  In terms of the historical context, therefore, I disagree with the implications regarding the stance of the 
Crown presented in R Boast Foreshore and Seabed (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005), 23: "However, the 
Crown Law Office, led at that time by Sir John Salmond, despite Tamihana Korokai, remained very 
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A close survey of the judgment yields additional reasons for the Crown's legal stance. The 
answers to two of the questions posed in the case stated proceeding were read by the Chief Justice 
on behalf of the Court of Appeal and reproduced towards the end of the official report of the 
judgment.70 First, the Court held that the Native Land Court had jurisdiction "to entertain and 
determine a claim by Natives to be owners of land claimed by the Crown, and to determine such a 
claim by an order binding the Crown".71 Second, Stout confirmed that it was a first instance 
question for the Native Land Court to:72 
[D]etermine upon proper evidence whether any particular piece of land is Native customary land or not, 
and in ascertaining this it may determine whether or not the area described in the application as "Lake 
Rotorua", or any part of it, is or is not a navigable lake; and, if so, whether according to Native custom 
the Maoris were and are the owners of the bed of such lake, or whether they had and have merely a right 
to fish in the waters thereof. 
This sort of language undoubtedly encouraged the Crown's legal advisors to regard the claims to the 
bed of Lake Rotorua as contestable at law and in evidence. Stray dicta in the judgments of the Court 
of Appeal casually intimated that the historical official view was that "for every part of land there 
was a Native owner." Even that, however, was subject to subtle qualifications in the Tamihana 
Korokai judgment, such as references to "habitable" land, as opposed to areas that could not be 
inhabited.73 Earlier asides from Court of Appeal judges had indicated changing judicial views on 
  
reluctant to concede that lakebeds merely had the status of ordinary Māori customary land". The Office 
considered that the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai had contemplated a range of possible legal 
conclusions under the Native Land Act 1909.  
70  Refer to Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 358-359 Sir Robert Stout, CJ. 
71  Ibid, 358. 
72  Ibid, 359 (emphasis added). 
73  Refer to Stout's judgment in ibid, above n 9, 340 citing comments by George Augustus Selwyn, Bishop of 
New Zealand, in 1860 as an authority for the proposition ("that there was originally a distinct owner for 
every habitable spot in the Northern Island") along with observations of the former Chief Justice, William 
Martin in 1847: "the whole surface of the Islands, or as much of it as is of any value to man, has been 
appropriated by the Natives, and, with the exception of the part which they have sold, is held by them as 
property." The source for the quoted passages from Selwyn and Martin was the collection of "opinions of 
various authorities on native tenure", collated by Alexander Mackay, Native Commissioner, and presented 
to both Houses of the General Assembly of New Zealand in 1890: Mackay to Native Minister (17 March 
1890) "Opinions of Various Authorities on Native Tenure", AJHR [1890] G-1, 3 (Bishop Selwyn, extracted 
from "Memorandum to the Governor, May 1860") and at 3 (Martin, cited as being from a "pamphlet of 
1846" [sic], but actually lifted from his anonymously prepared pamphlet of 1847 entitled England and the 
New Zealanders; Part 1 – Remarks upon a Despatch from the Right Hon Earl Grey to Governor Grey dated 
Dec 23 1846, (Bishops' Auckland, Auckland, 1847) 47). See also Appendix A, "Opinion on Native Tenure", 
"Appendix to the Governor's dispatch of 4th December 1860", in AJHR [1861] E-1. 
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the Treaty of Waitangi.74 Again though, the opinions of the judges gave succour to the view that it 
was for the Native Land Court to determine whether the type of Māori interaction with a given 
space was of sufficient quality in "custom" to accord with "ownership" rather than a fishing right not 
tied to the underlying proprietorship of the land. In an oft-neglected passage, the Chief Justice was 
also clear that legal recognition was purely dependent upon the incorporation of a customary interest 
in land into a system of freehold tenure. Thus, Stout J stated in a fashion reminiscent of Salmond's 
view that, "[t]he position all along assumed has been that the lands are vested in the Crown, and 
until the Crown issues a freehold title the customary titles cannot be recognized, but that the Crown 
will give to all who prove that the land was theirs, a freehold title."75 His Honour considered that, 
historically, "numerous Ordinances and Acts of Parliament have been passed to enable the Maoris to 
transmute their customary title into freehold". The exception to this position, noted Stout J, would 
be where the Crown demonstrated that it had title to the land in question or had terminated the 
power of the Native Land Court to issue orders by way of a proclamation under section 85 of the 
Native Land Act 1909.76 Section 85 of that legislation provided that a "proclamation by the 
Governor that any land vested in His Majesty the King is free from the Native customary title shall 
in all Courts and in all proceedings be accepted as conclusive proof of the fact so proclaimed". 
Salmond was certainly not inimical to the concept of pre-existing "customary land" status mantling 
land that was not submerged or land that was inundated by non-navigable internal or inland waters. 
In an opinion of 22 November 1916 to the Assistant Under-Secretary of Lands on Punaruku Island 
in Lake Rotokakahi in the district of Rotorua Salmond observed that "[t]here is no doubt that an 
island in a lake is just as much subject to Native customary title as the mainland until and unless that 
customary title has been destroyed by purchase or otherwise".77 The legal status of the adjoining 
mainland was considered to be irrelevant. Thus, the "mere fact" that such parcels had been acquired 
by the Crown was "not in itself sufficient evidence that the Island is included in the title to the 
adjoining mainland". As a consequence of the outcome in Tamihana Korokai, however, the way was 
paved for the Native Land Court to hear the claims to the various lakes in the Rotorua district: 
  
74  For example, Justice Richmond was recorded as saying to counsel in Cook County Council v Rawiri Hinaka 
(1893) 11 NZLR 778, 780-781 (CA) that "The author and draughtsman of the Treaty did not consider that it 
had that meaning. He considered that it was limited to the actual possession of the Natives or to their actual 
occupation. But the modern interpretation has been that it recognised their right to every corner of the 
country, where a Native had never set foot". 
75  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 341 per Sir Robert Stout CJ (emphasis added). 
76  Ibid, 358. 
77  Salmond, Solicitor-General, to Assistant Under-secretary of Lands (22 November 1916) ABWN 8089 
W5272 Item 130, 433-435. 
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A "This Court has not Taken Cognisance of the Quality of Native Rights, but the Fact of Such 
Rights is a Question for this Court" – Whither the Common Law and Native Title?  
The success of plaintiff was incomplete. The statement of claim initially filed on behalf of 
Tamihana Korokai had sought, amongst other things, a "declaration" from the Supreme Court that 
"the land aforesaid covered by the water known as Lake Rotorua is Native Land within the meaning 
of The Native Land Act 1894". It is salutary to note that the submissions of counsel for Tamihana 
Korokai supported this line of approach whilst the Crown was in opposition. C B Morison, junior 
counsel to Skerrett, submitted on 24 July 1912 that section 11 of the Declaratory Judgments Act 
1908 empowered the ordinary courts to make declarations. That provision stated:  
The jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the Supreme Court to give or make any declaratory judgment or 
order shall not be excluded by the fact that the said Court has no power to give relief in the matter to 
which the judgment or order relates, or that such matter would, independently of this Act, be within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of any other Court (emphasis added). 
Thus, he continued, "This Court has not taken cognisance of the quality of native rights, but the 
fact of such rights is a question for this Court".78 Three cases were cited in support of this 
proposition namely the Court of Appeal decision in Re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871 
(Lundon),79 Wallis v Solicitor-General,80 and Nireaha Tamaki v Baker.81 He alleged that 
section 72 of the imperial New Zealand Constitution Act 185282 "recognises the Treaty of Waitangi 
[because] it provides the native customary title can only be taken away by cession to the Crown".83 
Section 87 of the Native Land Act was then referred to as presuming that a period of ten years 
"possession by [the] Crown [was sufficient] to extinguish native title [and] any less period would 
not".84 The plaintiff failed to obtain a declaration as to the "fact" of such rights with the Court of 
Appeal determining it to be a matter for investigation in the Native Land Court, the specialist court 
  
78  Hubert Ostler, Assistant Law Officer, handwritten summary of "Skerrett and Morison's Arguments", Crown 
Law Office Case 84, Wellington, 7 (emphasis added). 
79  In re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871 (1872) 2 NZCA 41. 
80  Wallis v Solicitor-General [1903] AC 173 (PC) 
81  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2. 
82  15 & 16 Vict, c 72 (Imp), 30 June 1852. Section 72 provided amongst other things, "subject to the 
Provisions herein contained, it shall be lawful for the said General Assembly to make Laws for regulating 
the Sale, Letting, Disposal, and Occupation of the Waste Lands of the Crown in New Zealand; and all lands 
wherein the Title of Natives shall be extinguished as herein-after mentioned, … shall be deemed and taken 
to be Waste Lands of the Crown within the meaning of this Act …". 
83  Ostler, above n 78, 7. See also to the summary of their oral submissions in the report of Tamihana Korokai v 
Solicitor-General, above n 9, 331.  
84  Ibid. 
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on questions of the ascertainment and determination of native land established via statute. That is, 
Skerrett and Morison achieved that aspect of their client's claim, but not a "declaration of title" as to 
the "existence of customary land in Lake Rotorua" from the ordinary courts. In this respect, the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Lundon in 1872 was of contextual interest, as the reported oral 
submissions of Skerrett and Morison clearly record the use of the case as support for the statement 
that the "Crown is bound both by the common law and its own engagements to a recognition of 
Native rights".85 In 1872 the Court of Appeal itself had indeed said that, "The Crown is bound, both 
by the common law of England and its own solemn engagements, to a full recognition of Native 
proprietary right".86  
Yet, none of the judges in Tamihana Korokai responded to this particular reference nor was it 
cited in any of the opinions. Salmond's recorded submissions in Tamihana Korokai reveal 
disagreement with the obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal in its 1872 ruling. Subsequently, in 1918, 
as he prepared case notes for the "Rotorua Lake" proceeding in the Native Land Court, Salmond 
accounted for the passing reference to the "common law of England" in Lundon in the following 
fashion: "obiter dicta … What does this ["the common law of England"] know about native 
customary title".87 Arney CJ delivered the decision of the Court of Appeal in 1872. He clarified, in 
a manner consistent with Chapman J in the 1847 decision of Regina v Symonds, that, "Whatever the 
extent of that right by established Native custom appears to be, the Crown is bound to respect it."88 
He continued with the important following comment:89 
But the fullest measure of respect is consistent with the assertion of the technical doctrine, that all title to 
land by English tenure must be derived from the Crown; this of necessity importing that the fee-simple 
of the whole territory of New Zealand is vested and resides in the Crown, until it be parted with by grant 
from the Crown. 
The analysis of the Chief Justice proceeded to observe that:90 
The argument so much insisted upon [that the lands in question were "native lands" and not "Crown 
lands"] involves the absurdity of supposing that the Crown is granting what does not belong to the 
Crown. 
  
85  See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 331. 
86  In re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871, above n 79, 49. The litigation file does not reveal anything 
further regarding the context for this particular quote. 
87  Salmond "Lundon v Whitaker Claims [sic] 2 CA 41 (1872)", undated (1918?) CL174/2, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington. 
88  In re the Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871, above n 79, 49. 
89  Ibid (emphasis added). 
90  Ibid, 50. 
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He explored this assertion further with the comment: "If nothing passed by grants from the 
Crown to Natives of lands already owned by themselves under Native custom, it would be an idle 
ceremony to issue such instruments."91 Yet, he added, "something does pass – the whole legal fee 
passes; and in respect of this legal fee remaining vested in the Crown down to the time when the 
grant passes the seal of the Colony and receives the Governor's signature, every such instrument 
may, with absolute propriety, be termed a grant of Crown lands."92 From the vantage point of 1912, 
it would have been understood that the Lundon case was specifically about the interaction between 
the Crown Grants Act 1866, the Native Lands Act 1865 and the leasing of native lands, rather than 
any alleged common law obligations of the Crown. That is, it would have been appreciated what 
was at issue legally for the purposes of a particular judgment. The concept of the Crown's 
underlying title as a fee simple differed from succeeding late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century views as to "radical title" although I do not explore this question in detail in this essay. 
The distinct reference to the "common law of England" binding the Crown, expressed in obiter 
dicta, did not suggest to legal counsel or to the Court of Appeal in the early twentieth century a 
discrete source for the legal acknowledgement or recognition of enforceable customary rights at 
common law, as opposed to a Treaty-centred stance on statute-based law.93 It did not form part of 
  
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
93  This obiter dicta would, however, be gathered up by commentators in the late twentieth century (McHugh 
was the pathfinder) and early twenty-first century to suggest a golden thread of reasoning about native title 
independently actionable at common law in the courts. See, most notably, J Evans "Reflections on Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker" (2007) 2 Te Tai Haruru: Journal of Māori Legal Writing, 103-132; F M Brookfield 
Waitangi & Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law & Legitimation, (rev ed, Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 2006) 128-129; John William Tate "Hohepa Wi Neera: Native Title and the Privy Council 
Challenge" (2004) 35 VUWLR 73, 103, n 107. McHugh in 1984 ("Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts" 
(1984) 2 Canterbury LR, 235, 245-251) was of this disposition but has since altered his viewpoint in relation 
to New Zealand legal history, principally due to the methodological influence of J G A Pocock (for this turn 
in McHugh's stance, see, for instance, M Walters "Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality" 
(2007) 57 UTLJ 819, 822-823). J Evans alleges that the "common law" comment in Lundon was part of the 
ratio of the decision "because to reach its decision the Court had to determine whether the lands in question 
were 'crown lands', in the sense of the 1866 Act, notwithstanding the existence of the native title" (Evans, 
ibid, 103-132, 116, n 47). I disagree. The Court of Appeal was confronted with a situation where Native 
Land Court orders ascertaining title had been made under the Native Lands Act 1865 and certificates of title 
had already been issued or were about to issue in respect of the ascertained customary proprietors under the 
Native Lands Act 1865. All of the relevant legal events flowed from interpreting that statutory situation. 
The certificates of title are on the Crown's litigation file. The Court held that, had section 75 of the Native 
Lands Act 1865 continued to apply, "uncorrected by subsequent legislation", then the leases made after the 
Native Land Court orders but before the issuing of certificates would have been void at law. The Crown 
Grants Acts of 1866 and 1867, however, altered the decision. The Court of Appeal said that "the effect [of 
section 7(1) of the Crown Grants Amendment Act 1867] has been virtually to authorize sales and leases 
made by individual Natives at any time after an order in their favour under section 23 of 'The Native Lands 
Act 1865'" ((1872) 2 NZCA 41 at 51). It is also important to realise that the decision of the Commissioner, 
Alexander Johnston, and dated 15 April 1872 relies on the Treaty of Waitangi as the "basis of the policy and 
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the instinctive mental architecture of the counsel or of the presiding judges. It is not sufficient to 
ascribe this silence to an alleged neglect, misunderstanding or forgetfulness in respect of the 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court under Marshall CJ (from 1801 until 1835) on 
Native American title, or to the ruling of the Supreme Court in New Zealand in Regina v Symonds 
(1847) (Symonds).94 These sources were certainly cited before the Court of Appeal in Tamihana 
Korokai. The understanding of their meaning in 1912 (let alone 1847)95 does, however, differ from 
subsequent treatments of this case law in some of the legal historical literature of the late twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century. Unless this starting point is appreciated with its own 
historical subtleties and without the condescension of posterity, much of New Zealand's legal 
history will seem somewhat obscure and marginalised against the now conventional view that the 
true and correct common law (other views being simply construed as ill-advised or "wrong") was 
always waiting to be heroically uplifted and brought into the legal light once more.96  
In this context, it is also salutary to recall that the legal system was still gradually developing a 
concept and the means of proceeding against the Crown beyond petitions of right or writs of scire 
facias and comparable to the processes involving ordinary litigant parties in private law situations.97 
  
legislation" of both the Imperial Parliament and the colonial legislature (see report of Alexander Johnston at 
paragraph 13) as opposed to any "common law". 
94  The use of which I have dealt with elsewhere in the context of British imperial policy formation in Mark 
Hickford "Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages on the Globe: An Approach to the Intellectual History of 
Māori Property Rights, 1837-1853" (2006) 27(1) History of Political Thought 122-167 ["Intellectual History 
of Māori Property Rights"]; and Mark Hickford Making "Territorial Rights of the Natives": Britain and 
New Zealand, 1830-1847 (D Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999). Also note the recent adjustments in 
Paul McHugh's own view as noted in Making "Territorial Rights of the Natives": Britain and New Zealand, 
1830-1847 14-19; P G McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, 
Status, and Self-determination, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 125 ["Aboriginal Societies"]; P G 
McHugh "The Common-law Status of Colonies and Aboriginal 'Rights': How Lawyers and Historians Treat 
the Past" (1998) 61 Sask L Rev 428-429; McHugh "A Tribal Encounter: the Presence and Properties of 
Common-law Language in the Discourse of Colonization in the Early Modern Period" Voyages and 
Beaches: Pacific Encounters 1769-1840 (Hawaii University Press, Honolulu, 1999) 114-131, 127-128. 
Also, Walters, above n 93, 823: "Indeed, in [Aboriginal Societies] McHugh challenges some key 
assumptions about Aboriginal legal history that his earlier legal scholarship helped to make respectable 
(perhaps even orthodox) for a generation of judges and lawyers – including the very idea that a general 
common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights existed historically." 
95  Hickford "Intellectual History of Māori Property Rights, ibid, 145-155. 
96  I believe that the historical method in this article on Salmond's approach and that of the Crown addresses 
some of the outstanding queries and alleged obscurities that Emeritus Professor J Evans of the University of 
Auckland has raised in his valuable contribution, which Professor David Williams brought to my attention 
in February 2007 after having read a draft of my article: Evans, above n 93, 103-132. 
97  See the Crown Suits Act 1881, the Crown Suits Act 1908 and Rodney Brazier "The Monarchy" in Bogdanor 
(ed), above n 33, 89-45, 87. Compare W S Holdsworth "The History of Remedies Against the Crown" 
[1922] 38 LQR, 280-256 (I owe the Holdsworth reference to Dr Paul McHugh). In this vein, the procedural 
and legal situation was somewhat more complex than implied in John William Tate's otherwise detailed 
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This point ought not to be lost sight of, as it informed the framework for those legal counsel 
operating on contested questions involving Crown grants of land. Hence, in the 1840s the public 
seal of the colony affixed to a Crown grant was thought to constitute conclusive evidence of the 
Crown's prior proprietorship, its entitlement to grant to others and the validity of the transfer. The 
lawfulness of a Crown grant under the public seal was assumed and could not be challenged or 
vitiated unless, for instance, the grantee had deceived the Crown or there was some misdescription 
on the face of the record that could be construed as resulting in "uncertainty". The proper process to 
address a Crown grant that was either void98 or voidable was to seek cancellation via the 
prerogative writ of scire facias, a process accompanied by its own rather complicated and 
specialised case law. In 1848 Chapman J had noted that the Crown's conveyance of property to third 
parties could only occur with grants under the public seal.99 In Regina v Taylor and Regina v Clarke 
Martin CJ had pronounced on legal principles applicable to the scire facias procedure.100 
Subsequently, in 1872, a Court of Appeal bench containing three of the judges that presided in 
Lundon (including Arney CJ), would apply the law regarding scire facias in Regina v Fitzherbert to 
refuse the repeal of a Crown grant in circumstances where it was alleged that the grant "was made in 
prejudice of the rights of certain aboriginal natives, the former owners of lands in the grant 
  
account of Wi Parata and Tamaki v Baker in "The Privy Council and Native Title: A Requiem for Wi 
Parata?" (2004) 12 Waikato LR, 101; and "Tamihana Korokai", above n 39, 108.  Also consider R v 
Puketapu Sawmilling Co Ltd (1907) 29 NZLR 654 and Mudgway v Davy and Buick (1886) NZLR 4 CA 
192. 
98  But see R v M'Intosh (No 1) vol 1 (1851) Legge 680. 
99  See Scott v Grace (13 May 1848) reprinted in Hickford "Settling Some Very Important Principles of 
Colonial Law: Three 'Forgotten' Cases of the 1840s" (2004) 35 VUWLR 1-71, 71: "… it has already been 
decided by this Court after much consideration, in the case of the Queen v Symonds, that the Crown can 
convey nothing to the subject, except under the public seal of the colony" ["Three 'Forgotten' Cases"]. 
100  See, for example, "Report of the proceedings of a trial in the Supreme Court at Auckland, on a writ of scire 
facias – The Queen v George Clarke" in Colonial Office ("CO") 209/63, fos 146 and following (1-20), 
National Archives, Kew, London: "…where the King is not deceived in his consideration nor otherwise to 
his prejudice by any suggestions on the part of the grantee, but the intent was to pass the interest expressed 
in the Grant, only the King has been mistaken in the law; there he shall not be said to be deceived, to the 
avoidance of the Grant …" (ibid, 15).  The Judicial Committeee of the Privy Council upheld an appeal 
against the Supreme Court ruling in Clarke on another basis: R v Clarke (1849-1851) 7 Moo PC 77, 84; 13 
ER 808, 811 Rt Hon T Pemberton Leigh: "this is not a grant professing or intended to be made, as a matter 
of bounty or grace from the Crown, but it is only intended as a confirmation of that report, which was made 
under the authority of the ordinance". For Taylor see Hickford "Three 'Forgotten' Cases", 43 (Martin CJ) 
and 45 (Chapman J). Subsequently, the Judicial Committeee of the Privy Council would advise in R v 
Hughes (1865) LR 1 PC 1 (on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia) that a Crown grant was 
not a matter of record (even when issued under the public seal) unless it had been enrolled in a court of 
record. The importance of this point is that writs of scire facias seeking the cancellation of a Crown grant 
could only secure a cancellation where the grant was a matter of record. The Judicial Committeee suggested, 
however (without determining the matter conclusively), that this principle might not apply in New Zealand 
(ibid, 92-93). 
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described, and their descendants".101 Ultimately, a political resolution of the case was legislated 
(Native Reserves Act 1873). The Māori claimants raised two allegations in the pleadings for a writ 
of scire facias. First, they claimed that the Crown, at the date of the grant of 1851, held the lands 
comprised in that grant subject to a trust for the benefit of the aboriginal native owners. Second, it 
was alleged that the Crown by that instrument assumed to dispose of lands which had never been 
ceded to the Crown, and over which the native title had never been extinguished. In relation to the 
allegation that the lands in question had "never been ceded to the Crown, and that the Native title 
thereto has never been extinguished", Arney CJ stated that that plea could be "shortly disposed 
of".102 His Honour noted that:103 
 
No formal act of cession to the Crown was necessary. From and after the purchase of these lands by the 
[New Zealand Land] Company from the Natives, they became, by virtue of the alienation itself, part of 
the demesne lands of the Crown; insomuch that even if the purchase by the Company had been 
investigated by Commissioners under the Land Claims Ordinance No 1, and the same had been 
approved, and the Commissioners had recommended grants or a grant to the Company accordingly, it 
would have remained at the discretion of the Crown to make or refuse such grant. This title the Crown 
has always asserted. … 
It is also important to remember that the decision of Regina v Symonds in 1847, which expressly 
admitted the relevance of the jurisprudence on common law and ius gentium (the law of nations) of 
the United States Supreme Court during John Marshall's period of chief justiceship and now 
received as a New Zealand common law source, had not yet been printed in an official law report 
series. Its accessibility as a printed text in 1912 was still relatively limited104 (although it was 
possible to obtain copies from the Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, which certain major 
 
101  See Regina v Fitzherbert (1872) 2 NZCA 143 (CA) 165.  
102  Ibid, 172. 
103  Ibid, 172-173. 
104  The decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387 was originally 
printed officially in The New Zealand Gazette in 1847 and forwarded to the Colonial Office in London – see 
CO209/53, fos 45-47a, National Archives, Kew, London. The version of Regina v Symonds cited in Wi 
Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 23, 72, Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2 and Tamihana Korokai 
v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 321 was that printed in the Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1847-1848, 
vol. xliii, [892], 64-71, enclosed with George Grey to Earl Grey (5 July 1847) 64. It was not reported until 
the publication, in 1938, of the so-called "New Zealand Privy Council Cases" or "NZPCC" volume, a 
collection of cases that was, according to its publishers, intended to address a request of "[m]any members 
of the legal profession in New Zealand for the reports of appeals from the New Zealand courts to the 
Judicial Committeee to be contained in an accessible format" (see "Introduction" New Zealand Privy 
Council Cases, 1840-1932, (Wellington, 1938) ix). Also, "The inclusion of one Supreme Court judgment, 
delivered in 1847, The Queen v Symonds … is justified by its importance in New Zealand constitutional 
law, by the reference made to it in several judgments in the Reports and in the present volume, and by its 
previous difficulty of location."  
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libraries held).105 As I have discussed elsewhere, the jurisprudence underlying Symonds was, in 
itself, very much contested in terms of its relevance to British imperial policy on the "territorial 
rights of the natives".106 One of the presiding judges in Symonds, William Martin himself, in 
surveying the state of the legal treatment of native title within New Zealand, said sixteen years later 
in 1863 that "The case stands thus: no native can in any way enforce any right of ownership or 
occupation of land, held by the native tenure, in the courts of the Colony".107 The engagement of 
Lord Davey with Symonds is revealing for the almost casual emphasis on the relevance of statute 
law as distinct from a justiciable common law source. Chapman J was noted to have held that native 
title could not be "extinguished otherwise then in strict compliance with the provisions of the 
statutes".108 This particular reception of Symonds persevered. In Tamihana Korokai, the Chief 
Justice stated that the decision in Wi Parata only "emphasized the decision in Reg[ina] v Symonds 
that the Supreme Court could take no cognisance of treaty rights not embodied in a statute, and that 
Native customary title was a kind of tenure that the Court could not deal with".109 Stout J 
considered the advice of the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker as "having recognized, 
however, that the Natives had rights under our statute law to their customary lands".110 This was not 
a dramatic volte face on the part of the Chief Justice but consistent with the tenor and detail of 
Lord Davey's speech. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Symonds was directly placed before the Court of Appeal 
in Tamihana Korokai, as it was included as "Appendix C" in the documentary collection for the 
special case stated removed to the Court of Appeal within the Crown Law Office proceedings file. 
Salmond's handwritten marginalia on that reprinted version of Symonds remain of interest in relation 
to Chapman J's opinion that:  
  
105  Certainly, the Grey Collection in the Free Public Library in Auckland had an extensive set of these papers 
according to its catalogue for 1888. The Hocken Library in Dunedin also appears to have had a set (referred 
to in its 1912 catalogue). 
106  See Hickford "Intellectual History of Māori Property Rights", above n 94, 122-167; Hickford Making 
"Territorial Rights of the Natives", above n 94, as recently noted in McHugh Aboriginal Societies, above n 
94, 125; Bain Attwood "The Law of the Land or the Law of the Land? History, Law and Narrative in a 
Settler Society" (2004) 2 History Compass 1-30, and Michael Belgrave Historical Frictions: Māori Claims 
& Reinvented Histories (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2005) 29. Also, in the introductory essay, 
see Hickford "Three 'Forgotten' Cases", above n 99, 1-71. 
107  Martin "Observations on the Proposal to take Native Lands under an Act of the Assembly", enclosed with 
Martin to William Fox, 16 November 1863, CO209/178, fo 163 (35), National Archives, Kew, London. 
108 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 2, 579. 
109  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 344  (CA) Stout CJ (emphasis added). 
110  Ibid. 
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[I]t is now part of the law of the land, and although the Courts of the United States in suits between their 
own subjects will not allow a grant to be impeached under [the] pretext that the native title has not been 
extinguished, yet they would certainly not hesitate to do so in a suit by one of the native Indians.  
Salmond had underlined the section of that passage commencing with the words "not hesitate to 
do so…", beside which appeared the following handwritten comment in the margin: "Questioned in 
Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington".111 As at 1912, Salmond was correct to point this out. In 
presenting Wi Parata Prendergast CJ doubted the analysis of Chapman J and referred to the passage 
of the text (lecture 51 in James Kent's Commentaries on American Law), which Chapman had cited 
in support of his proposition that the courts in the United States would "not hesitate" to entertain a 
suit on the part of Native Americans to impeach a grant on the ground of the native title having not 
been extinguished. Prendergast CJ concluded that Chapman J's statement was not a "legitimate 
inference" to draw from Kent's text.112 The passage in question that Prendergast CJ quoted from 
Commentaries on American Law stated that:113 
Even with respect to the Indian reservation lands, of which they still retain the occupancy, the validity of 
a patent has not hitherto been permitted to be drawn in question in a suit between citizens of the State, 
under the pretext that the Indian right and title, as original lords of the soil, had not been extinguished.  
Likewise, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, Cherokee Nation v State of 
Georgia,114 which Chapman J had also relied upon, had not sustained the bald proposition that 
  
111  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General "Special case stated pursuant to Rule 245" Appendix C, 21, Crown 
Law Office Case 84A, Wellington. 
112  Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, 80 Prendergast CJ. 
113  Cited as "3 Kent's Com, 378" in ibid, 80. Given the passage quoted and the page reference that Prendergast 
provided, it could appear that His Honour was citing from the 1873 edition (James Kent Commentaries on 
American Law (Oliver Wendell Holmes (ed), 12 ed, vol 3, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1873) 378), 
or from the 1844 edition (James Kent Commentaries on American Law (5 ed, vol 3, New York, 1844) 378). 
Due to the relative stability in the pagination from one edition to the next, it is not evident which particular 
edition of Kent's Commentaries on American Law the Chief Justice used.  
114  Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia 5 Peters 1 (1831) (USSC). 
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Chapman J had crafted.115 The Cherokee Nation case essentially determined that "an Indian tribe or 
nation within the United States" could not "maintain an action in the courts of the United States".116  
In response to the submissions of counsel in Tamihana Korokai, Edwards J said that the 
Supreme Court had "no jurisdiction to inquire into purely Native titles", nor could it "investigate 
questions arising out of the procedure and practice of the Native Land Court so long as that Court" 
acted within jurisdiction.117 In spite of that, he confirmed that the Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction:118 
[T]o interpret the statutes to which the Native Land Court owes its existence and its jurisdiction; to 
confine that Court within the limits of that jurisdiction if it is being exceeded; and to compel that Court 
to exercise its jurisdiction if, for some fancied reason not arising out of Native customs and usages, it 
refuses or fails to do so.  
Chapman J admitted that: "it is quite true that the Courts administering the ordinary laws have 
never had the means of conveniently investigating such [Native] titles".119 It was for that reason, 
His Honour suggested, that a "special tribunal" in the form of the Native Land Court was required. 
Nevertheless, Chapman acknowledged that various pieces of legislation, such as the Native Land 
Act 1873, recognised the existence of Maori claims to land. "The various statutory recognitions of 
the Treaty of Waitangi; mean no more, but they certainly mean no less, than those recognitions of 
Native rights".120 Perhaps addressing the obiter dicta of Arney CJ in Lundon, Stout CJ in Tamihana 
Korokai in 1912 did say that it was "not necessary to point out that if the Crown in New Zealand 
had not conserved the Native rights and carried out the treaty a gross wrong would have been 
  
115  For brief synopses of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cherokee Nation v State of 
Georgia, see Lindsay G Robertson Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed 
Indigenous Peoples of their Lands (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) 131-132; Howard Berman 
"The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States" (1978) 27 Buff L Rev 
637, 656-660; Burke "The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality" (1969) 21 Stan L Rev 
500, 503-516; Lisa Ford "Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in Georgia and New 
South Wales, 1788-1836" (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2007) 385-387. 
116  Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia, above n 114, 20 Marshall CJ. Importantly, the language of Marshall CJ 
was guarded and non-committal regarding the possibility of entertaining suits concerning land: "That part of 
the bill which respects the land occupied by the Indians and prays the aid of the court to protect their 
possession, may be more doubtful.  The mere question of right might perhaps be decided by this court in a 
proper case with proper parties.  But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title.  The bill requires 
us to control the Legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force.  It savors too much 
of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial department. " (Ibid). 
117  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 349. 
118  Ibid. 
119  Ibid, 358. 
120  Ibid. 
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perpetrated",121 although the obligation was certainly perceived to be political in nature rather than 
one sourced and legally enforceable in common law.  
Nor is it proper to simply attribute the different understanding to a predilection towards a so-
called Austinian or "positivistic" conception of law, as certain commentators have been inclined to 
do.122 In New Zealand at this time, the Treaty of Waitangi and not the common law was viewed as 
the source of political or "moral" claims to legal rights on the part of Māori. Skerrett was 
manoeuvered to say that, "[o]ur rights are statutory, [and] therefore can only be interfered with 
under statutory powers".123 The thread of Skerrett's presentation was expressed in a sequence of 
steps founded upon the Treaty entered into in 1840. First, he stated that: "Before settlement Maoris 
were permanent occupiers of all land in [the] North Island and whether occupied in fact or not [they 
were] treated as occupiers."124 Skerrett admitted that, "If rights [had] not been founded on treaty 
[then the] question might have arisen but [the] treaty [and] legislation recognised [the] right to 
occupancy of all land in [the] North Island".125 He argued that, hitherto, the prevailing stance of the 
ordinary courts within New Zealand concerning the Treaty of Waitangi had been "erroneous" 
because "no Court has [the] right to question [the] status of natives as a state fixed by the treaty".126 
At this juncture, the decision of Gillies J in Mangakahia & Anor v New Zealand Timber Co Ltd in 
1882 was cited in Skerrett's submission as evidence of judicial criticism of the Wi Parata approach 
on the status of the Treaty of Waitangi at law.127 In that case, Gillies J had posed the legal question: 
  
121  Ibid, 343. 
122  See, for example, Frederika Hackshaw, "Nineteenth Century Notions of Aboriginal Title and Their 
Influence on the Interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi" in I H Kawharu (ed) Waitangi: Māori and Pākehā 
Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) 92-120, 92-93, 99-103 
and Paul McHugh in 1991: The Māori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 116 [The Māori Magna Carta]. Evidently, the intellectual genealogy of 
any policy or legal decision ought to be approached with methodological care. See the caution in Stefan 
Collini Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850-1930 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1991) 2-5 (method), 256-268 (reception of Austinian analysis in legal scholarship and 
teaching). See also, Stefan Collini, Donald Winch and John Burrow "The Governing Science: Things 
Political and the Intellectual Historian" in That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-century 
Intellectual History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) 3-21. 
123  Ostler "Skerrett and Morison's Arguments", above n 78, 10. 
124  Ibid, 2. 
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid, 2-3 (Skerrett referred to Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 112 as an exemplar of the 
approach: "Prevailing view of Courts in [New Zealand] erroneous. Have always treated Treaty of Waitangi 
as a nullity [and] relied on previous discovery and settlement". 
127  Mangakahia & Anor v New Zealand Timber Co Ltd (1884) 2 NZLR 345 (SC) 350: "Theoretically the fee of 
all lands in the colony is in the Crown, subject nevertheless to the "full, exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands," guaranteed to the natives by the Treaty of Waitangi which is no such "simple 
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"[w]hat title does legally recognised ownership [under the Native Lands Act 1873] according to 
native custom confer?" and responded with the comment: "I answer that no title known to English 
law is thereby conferred."128 Once ascertained by the Native Land Court, Gillies J accepted that 
a:129 
[P]re-existing right according to native custom is thereby recognised and declared - an exclusive right of 
occupation – a right to sell or otherwise dispose of that right of occupation – a right to inherit not 
according to the rules of English law but according to Maori custom – all these are recognised and 
declared, but though in many respects they are analogous to, they are not equivalent to, a title in fee 
simple.  
The Supreme Court explained that, "If a recognised and declared native owner sell to a 
European the purchaser does not derive his title from the vendor, he merely extinguishes the 
vendor's right of occupation, but derives his title from the Crown".130 It was not treated as a legal 
estate upon which one could found an action in trespass.131  
In accordance with his line of reasoning regarding the Crown's political acceptance of the status 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, Skerrett insisted that, "If the Crown treats the Maoris as an independent 
state that is binding on this Court", as the "[s]tatus of natives is determined by the Crown [and the] 
Court is bound by that determination".132 Skerrett concluded that the "rights of Treaty where 
Natives have become subjects are cognisable by [the] Courts".133 Yet he confessed that this "point 
[was] only of academic interest, because [the] treaty recognised [was] recognised by our Statute law 
and thus given [the] effect of law".134 In addition, he submitted that "the Native land legislation is 
  
nullity," as it is termed in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, quoted in argument in this case" [footnote 
omitted].  
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Unless the party taking trespass action was in the possession of the land subject to a "memorial of 
ownership" under the Native Lands Act 1873. Justice Gillies held that, "The argument used, that according 
to this doctrine the native would have no remedy against trespass on his lands, is fallacious. So long as he is 
in possession he has his remedy. If out of possession he must perfect his occupationary title by exchanging 
it for a title under the Crown, where he can claim all the rights and remedies incident to such a title" (ibid, 
351). 
132  Ostler "Skerrett and Morison's Arguments", above n 78, 2. 
133  Ibid, 3. In the official report's summary of his submissions it was also noted that: "The rights of Natives rest 
upon the treaty and not upon their bare rights jure gentium: see article 2 of the treaty": Tamihana Korokai v 
Solicitor-General, above n 9, 329. 
134  Ibid. 
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only explained by reference to [the] Treaty".135 Salmond was certainly at pains to distinguish the 
relevant United States judicial sources on the grounds that "American Natives are looked upon as 
separate political communities", and "by the American Constitution a treaty is part of the supreme 
law of the land, to be taken notice of and enforced by the law-courts, and prevailing over a 
statute".136 In contrast to the United States, he used a number of cases to illustrate the English and 
imperial position, including Cook v Sprigg.137 In that case, the Privy Council dealt with a claim that 
grantees of mineral and other concessions from a paramount chief of Pondoland prior to the 
acquisition of British sovereignty via cession were enforceable against the incoming Crown. In 
dismissing the claim of the grantees, the Lords advised that:138 
All that can be properly meant by [the] proposition [that private property is respected by the sovereign 
accepting a cession] is that according to well-understood rules of international law a change of 
sovereignty by cession ought not to affect private property, but no municipal tribunal has authority to 
enforce such an obligation.  
B Detailing the Crown Legal Theory Further – Territorial and Non-territorial Customary 
Rights in 1914 
In 1914 Salmond secured a favoured Treaty of Waitangi-based or centred account of Māori 
customary fishing rights at law in the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court in 
Waipapakura v Hempton (Waipapakura). A common law source for customary proprietary rights 
did not feature in the relevant conception of the Crown's legal stance at all. It was not merely a 
statute-based argument but a Treaty-centred theory also.139 If this is properly appreciated, then the 
analytical subtleties of the developing Crown "register", which Salmond and his colleagues were 
exploring in internal legal advisory work, become considerably clearer (not to mention the areas of 
convergence and divergence with the varied perspectives of legal commentators as at, say, 2007). 
Section 8 of the Fish Protection Act 1877 had referred to fisheries rights arising out of the Treaty of 
Waitangi of 1840.140 It stated that: "[n]othing in this Act contained shall be deemed to repeal, alter, 
or affect any of the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, or to take away, annul, or abridge any of 
  
135  Ibid. 
136  Ibid, 333. 
137  Cook v Sprigg [1899] AC 572 (PC). 
138  Ibid, 578. 
139  Compare McHugh The Maori Magna Carta, above n 122, 118-119 and 121-122; John William Tate 
"Tamihana Korokai and Native Title", above n 39, 108. 
140  Fish Protection Act 41 Vict, number 45 (8 December 1877) "An Act for the Protection of Fish and Fisheries 
in New Zealand".  
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the rights of the aboriginal natives to any fishery secured to them thereunder".141 In argument 
before the court in Waipapakura v Hempton, Salmond averred that section 8 of the Fish Protection 
Act 1877 corresponded with section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908, which provided that, "Nothing 
in this Part of this Act shall affect any existing Maori fishing-rights". That is, he submitted that it 
was "merely a saving clause and [did] not create rights".142 The case emerged out of the seizure on 
22 August 1913 of a set of fishing nets from one Waipapakura by fisheries officers on the grounds 
of an alleged breach of clause 3 of regulations made under the Fisheries Act 1908 dated 
19 September 1911.143 The nets in question had been used for fishing in the tidal waters of the 
Waitara River on the mid-western coast of the North Island in Taranaki. Waipapakura had been 
using more than one set-net in conjunction with groynes in order to capture whitebait. The case was 
initially heard before Alfred Crooke, the stipendiary magistrate at Waitara. The plaintiff, 
Waipapakura, claimed £10 in damages from the defendant, John Hempton, the Collector of Customs 
at New Plymouth, on the basis that his agents "acting under his orders and directions, converted to 
his own use and wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of the use and possession" of three whitebait-
fishing nets.144  
The reserved decision of the stipendiary magistrate, presented in the case on appeal document 
for the Supreme Court, recorded that the plaintiff had been using a groyne, involving a series of 
heaped stones running from the bank of the Waitara River to its centre line, with sets of nets fixed 
between the stones.145 In delivering his reserved judgment on 26 November 1913, Alfred Crooke 
nonsuited the plaintiff's claim for damages upon the ground that the existence or otherwise of Māori 
fishing rights could only be ascertained and proved via the Native Land Court process, but he gave 
leave to Waipapakura to appeal his decision. The magistrate referred to a particular finding of the 
Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai as authority for the proposition that the Native Land Court 
had "jurisdiction to inquire into a claim by the Maoris of a customary right of fishing".146 Indeed, 
  
141  By way of comparison, section 11 of the Wanganui River Trust Act 1891 stated that, "Nothing in this Act 
contained shall affect any rights conferred upon the Natives by the Treaty of Waitangi, or shall be deemed 
to confer upon the Trust any jurisdiction over private lands, or over any Native lands the title to which has 
not been investigated by the Native Land Court …". 
142  Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 8, 1068. 
143  See The New Zealand Gazette (vol 2, 21 September 1911) 2816. 
144  "Case on appeal from the decision of Alfred Crooke, Esq, Stipendiary Magistrate at Waitara", Supreme 
Court of New Zealand (Taranaki District), paragraph 1, Crown Law Office Case 267, Wellington 5. 
145  Ibid, 2. The relevant passage continued with the following observation: "As the water rises with the inflow 
of the tide the nets are shifted from the openings in deep water to those which are nearer to the bank, and 
consequently in shallow water. The nets are of the same description as those which were used by the Maoris 
in the olden days, except that wire gauze is now substituted for rushes for the belly of the net". 
146  Ibid, 4-5. 
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Crooke referred to Stout CJ's statement of the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Tamihana 
Korokai147 to the effect that: 
[I]t was a question for the Native Land Court to determine whether according to Native custom the 
Maoris (the plaintiffs in that case) were and are the owners of the bed of Lake Rotorua, and whether they 
had and have merely a right to fish in the waters thereof.  
If he was incorrect on that point, he noted that by section 25 of the Native Land Act 1909 the 
Governor had power by Order-in-Council to confer jurisdiction upon the Native Land Court "in any 
matter or question affecting the rights of Natives in any real or personal property".148 
On the appeal, Stout CJ noted in presenting the judgment of Full Court on 30 July 1914 that 
there was, "no allegation in this case that the land over which the tide flows belongs to the 
Maoris".149 His Honour remarked that "the Maoris have land adjoining, but if so the Crown grant 
would be to high-water mark and would not include the land under the sea or tidal waters".150 This 
view was undoubtedly bolstered by section 35 of the Crown Grants Act 1908,151 even though that 
statute was not expressly referred to either in the record of oral submissions or in the judgment 
itself. Legal recognition would be limited to the landward side of the high-water mark margin of the 
foreshore.152 
So far as sea-fisheries are concerned – and the question of fishing-rights on inland rivers adjoining 
Maori land is not before the Court – there must, in our opinion, be some legislative provision made 
before the Court can recognize the private rights, if any, of Maoris to fish in the sea or in tidal waters.  
In that sense, the reference to "existing Maori fishing-rights" was interpreted as connoting rights 
that could only yield legal consequences to the extent that they were accorded distinct statutory 
recognition elsewhere. Stout CJ did not share what such a discrete form of provision might have 
looked like in the context of fisheries within the tidal waters of New Zealand. 
Yet the key explanation for Stout CJ's position on "legislative provision" in the judgment is not 
to be found in the text of his decision. That official report is merely a remnant – tanquam tabula 
  
147  See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 359 (CA). 
148  "Case on appeal from the decision of Alfred Crooke, Esq, Stipendiary Magistrate at Waitara", above n 144, 
5. 
149  Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 8, 1072. 
150  Ibid. 
151  Section 35 of the Crown Grants Act 1908 provided: "Where in any grant the ocean, sea, or any sound, bay, 
or creek, or any part thereof affected by the ebb or flow of the tide, is described as forming the whole or part 
of the boundary of the land granted, such boundary or part thereof shall be deemed and taken to be the line 
of high-water mark at ordinary tides." 
152  Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 8, 1072. 
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naufragii (like a plank from a shipwreck). Rather, the relevant context is to be located in Salmond's 
legal submissions in the Crown Law Office litigation file, as those submissions were merely 
summarised in the official report of Waipapakura v Hempton, with much of the explanatory subtlety 
concealed. Salmond proposed that the two principal questions posed for the Supreme Court were, 
first whether Maori fishing rights could be recognised by any court other than the Native Land 
Court and, second whether any such rights existed and, if so, what were those rights. The status of 
the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand law and constitutional history formed the centrepiece of 
Salmond's argument. "This treaty", said Salmond, "has not itself the force of law and is not in itself 
the source of legal rights".153 He added that, "It so operates only if and so far as the rights so 
referred to have been transformed by statute into legal rights. Tamihana case."154 The line of 
reasoning then turned to the native land legislation: "So far as customary ownership [of land] is 
concerned this has long since been done". Earlier in the typescript document, Salmond considered 
that, "[t]erritorial fisheries of the Maoris are of two kinds: (1) On Native freehold lands (2) On 
Native customary lands".155 He stated that nothing in the Fisheries Act 1908 was intended to affect 
those rights. Thus, "Maoris have undoubtedly fishing rights in all Native freehold lands", whilst it 
could not be doubted that territorial fisheries rights existed in respect of "customary land", as "they 
[were] incidental to and included in the right of Native customary ownership recognised by [the] 
Native Land Act".156  
Such rights were, therefore, "legal statutory rights" although Salmond added that it may be 
"sufficient for the present case to point out that the locus in quo is not claimed or proved to be 
Native customary land: what is claimed is apparently a non-territorial fishery".157 Hutchen, for the 
appellant, disavowed any claim to the bed of the tidal waters of the Waitara River.158 So-called 
"non-territorial" fisheries were the "customary rights of Maoris to fish in waters which do not 
belong to them", although it was evident, Salmond argued, that "no such rights [subsisted] in land 
for which Native title [had been] extinguished".159 Non-territorial rights could only exist over 
Crown lands, which had "never been the subject of Native ownership at all".160 There were only 
two classes of land that could be supposed to be in that position according to the argument of the 
Solicitor-General, specifically tidal waters and inland navigable waters. Tidal waters were the locus 
  
153  Salmond "Waipapakura v Hempton", argument, Crown Law Office Case 267, Wellington, 7. 
154  Ibid. 
155  Ibid, 2. 
156  Ibid. 
157  Ibid, 2-3. 
158  See Waipapakura v Hempton, above n 8, 1066. 
159  Salmond "Waipapakura v Hempton", argument, above n 153, 6. 
160  Ibid. 
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in quo in the Waipapakura litigation. The "boundary of Maori customary rights of ownership" was 
the high-water mark: "All land below high-water mark vested in the Crown by prerogative free from 
[the] Native title".161 Salmond perceived this legal point to be significant, as a contrary answer 
would imply that enclosed waters, such as harbours and bays, the foreshore and tidal waters would 
"belong to the Maoris except, [in] so far as the Crown [could] establish by purchase or otherwise 
that Native rights have been extinguished".162 
There were three entwined points that sustained the particular stance of the Crown. First, at 
common law the land inundated by tidal waters was within the proprietorship of the Crown. In 
support of this statement, Salmond used the third edition of the established English common law 
text by H Coulson of the Inner Temple and Urquhart Forbes of Lincoln's Inn, released in 1910.163 
Second, the presumed seaward limit of Crown grants to its subjects (including Māori), and 
"[t]herefore of that statutory grant constituted by the Treaty of Waitangi" was the high-water mark 
(a line of same imprecision in itself).164 It was, said Salmond, "Absurd to suppose that the whole 
country is fringed with a strip of land still belonging to Maoris by custom, because [it had] not 
[been] included in other Crown grants".165 Third, the public rights of fishing and navigation in tidal 
waters were rights that it had "not since Magna Carta [been] within the prerogative of the Crown to 
take away" (although this position was not as well-grounded as the extant case law suggested).166 
This implied limitation upon the prerogative power residing with the Crown was submitted to have 
legal consequences for the practical reach of the Treaty of Waitangi. As such, "[t]he Treaty and 
subsequent statutes should not be so construed as to take away this right by conferring on the Maoris 
  
161  Ibid. 
162  Ibid, 6-7. 
163  Salmond was relying upon H Coulson and Urquhart Forbes The Law Relating to Waters, Sea, Tidal and 
Inland (3 ed, Henry Sweet, London, 1910) 23, 26. This particular edition is no longer held within the Crown 
Law Office library. 
164  Salmond "Waipapakura v Hempton", argument, above n 153, 7. 
165  Ibid. 
166  Ibid. The reference to Magna Carta had become almost de rigueur in the context of exclusive fisheries at 
this time. However, Hubert S Moore, in his 1910 chapter on "Fisheries" in Halsbury's Laws of England, had 
cautioned that the interpretation of Magna Carta as preventing the exercise of the Crown's prerogative 
power to derogate from the public right of fishing through granting exclusive fisheries could be doubted on 
historical grounds: "There is considerable weight of evidence to show that Magna Charta had no bearing on 
the right of the Crown to create several fisheries; see Moore, History and Law of Fisheries, ch 2": Hubert S 
Moore, "Fisheries" The Laws of England, Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law of England, by 
Right Honourable the Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain (1885-86, 1886-92, and 
1895-1905) & other lawyers, (Vol 14, Butterworth & Co, London, 1910) para 1270, note t. See also, 
Geoffrey Marston The Marginal Seabed: United Kingdom Legal Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1981) 61-68. 
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exclusive rights of ownership, possession or use".167 The principal citation for the first part of this 
proposition was the barrister Hubert Stuart Moore's contribution of the chapter concerning 
"fisheries" in the fourteenth volume of Halsbury's Laws of England published in 1910.168 In the 
margin, Salmond had written in his own hand a reference to the recent advice in December 1913 of 
the Privy Council in Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada.169 A 
certain construction of the sixteenth chapter of the Magna Carta of Henry III vis-à-vis the 
exclusivity of a several fishery (together with its relevance to the dominion of New Zealand within 
the British Empire) underlay the Crown submission in Waipapakura. That chapter stated that, "No 
rivers shall be defended from henceforth, but such as were in defence in the time of king Henry our 
grandfather, by the same places, and the same bounds as they were wont to be in his time."170 The 
Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane recognised in Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-
General for Canada that the "legal character" of the right of subjects of the Crown to navigate and 
fish the "high seas and tidal waters alike" was difficult to define.171 In seeking a rationale, Haldane 
surmised that:172 
Finding its subjects exercising this right as from immemorial antiquity the Crown as parens patriæ no 
doubt regarded itself bound to protect the subject in exercising it, and the origin and extent of the right 
as legally cognizable are probably attributable to that protection, a protection which gradually came to 
be recognized as establishing a legal right enforceable in the Courts. 
The Privy Council was aware that, historically, there were exceptions to the maintenance of the 
jus or ius publicum with regard to fishing, specifically the existence of exclusive rights of fishery. 
  
167  Salmond "Waipapakura v Hempton", argument, above n 153, 7. 
168  Salmond was referring to Hubert S Moore "Fisheries", above n 166. 
169  Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada [1914] AC 153 at, to use Salmond's 
handwritten references in the margin, "p 168, p 170½, 171¹/3". The decision of the Judicial Committeee was 
dated 2 December 1913 and Salmond evidently had a copy of the official reported "Appeal Cases" version 
of the case in advance of the argument of Waipapakura v Hempton on 9 July 1914. 
170  Magna Carta, 9 Hen III, c 13-17, 1224-1225, "Nulla riparia de cetero defendatur [Nulle riparie defendantur 
de cetero] nisi ille que suerunt in defenso tempore Regis Henrici avi nostri per eadem loca et [per] eosdem 
terminus sicut esse consueverunt tempore suo." It is noted that only (1297) 25 Edw I (Magna Carta) c 29 
applies in New Zealand under the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. Chapter 29 states: "No freeman 
shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or 
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor [condemn him] but by lawful 
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any 
man either justice or right." Compare M Walters "Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and Exclusive Rights to 
Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada" (1998) 23 Queen's LJ 301; David Clark "The Icon of Liberty: The 
Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australian and New Zealand Law" (2000) 24  MULR 34. 
171  Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada, above n 169, 169. 
172  Ibid. 
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Haldane noted that the sixteenth chapter of the Magna Carta of Henry III was of a general nature 
and was clearly not restricted to tidal waters.  
Importantly, the Lord Chancellor stated that:173 
If [the words] had remained unconstrued by the Courts doubt might well have been entertained, as 
pointed out by Lord Blackburn in Neill v Duke of Devonshire, whether the 16th chapter, …, did more 
than restrain the writ de defensiore ripariæ, by which, when the King was about to come into a county, 
all persons might be forbidden from approaching the banks of the river, whether tidal or not, in order 
that the King might have his pleasure in fowling and fishing.  
But then, in a passage that revealed the instrinsically ahistorical nature of common law 
reasoning, Haldane advised that since the 1862 decision of the House of Lords in Malcolmson v 
O'Dea:174  
[I]t has been unquestioned law that since Magna Charta no new exclusive fishery could be created by 
Royal grant in tidal waters, and that no public right of fishing in such waters, then existing can be taken 
away without competent legislation.175  
Salmond would have observed the statement of the privy council that, "This is now part of the 
law of England, and their Lordships entertain no doubt that it is part of the law of British 
Columbia". The reception of English common law on the question of Magna Carta, the possibility of 
exclusive fisheries existing in tidal waters and for the received English common law to exercise a 
constraint on the interpretive possibilities of the Treaty of Waitangi and statutes such as the 
Fisheries Act 1908. Salmond did not pause to consider what, if any, relevance the comments of 
Chief Justice Stout in Baldick v Jackson in 1910 on the reception of English common law and 
statute on the right of the monarch to whales by virtue of the royal prerogative might have had on 
his argument.176 
  
173  Ibid, 170. In Neill v Duke of Devonshire (1882) 8 App Cas 135, Lord Blackburn had, in citing Matthew 
Hale's De Jure Maris, queried the interpretation of Magna Carta, but nevertheless accepted that the House 
of Lords had settled the matter in 1862: Malcolmson v O'Dea (1862) 10 HLC 591, 618 Hayes J. 
174  Malcolmson v O'Dea, ibid. 
175  Attorney-General of British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada, above n 169, 170. See also Coulson 
and Forbes The Law Relating to Waters, Sea, Tidal and Inland (Henry Sweet, London, 1880) 37: "Prior to 
Magna Charta the Crown had power to exclude the public from this right and to grant, a several and 
exclusive right, of fishing to individual subjects. This right cannot be granted by the Crown, and a several 
fishery in the sea can now only be claimed by prescription, or ancient usage presupposing a grant, or by 
express grant from the Crown prior to Magna Charta." 
176  Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343, 344-345: "I am of opinion that this statute has no applicability to 
New Zealand, and that though the right to whales is expressly claimed in the statute of 17 Ed II, c.2, as part 
of the Royal prerogative, it is one not only that has never been claimed, but one that it would have been 
impossible to claim without claiming it against the Māoris, for they were accustomed to engage in whaling; 
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As tidal waters were vested in the Crown, the question for Salmond was whether the Supreme 
Court could take away such notice of customary non-territorial rights of fishing. In response he 
commented that, "Even if such rights exist by custom, they had never been given statutory 
recognition or legal validity".177 It was also his view that, "In the present case… the locus in quo is 
not Native freehold land; if it was, the question would arise whether the provisions of the Act can be 
said to affect such rights".178 The Fisheries Act 1908 was "designed to protect those [proprietary] 
rights, [and] not to take them away"; examples included "close[d] season[s] and restrictions on the 
methods of fishing".179 He stated that, "it is in the interests of the Maoris themselves that these 
restrictions should be imposed".180 The submissions stressed that the rights referred to in 
section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908 were "the private and propriet[a]ry rights of the Maoris not 
their liberty to fish [possessed in common with the public] the tidal waters".181 Accordingly, the 
submissions averred that, "[s]o far… as the fisheries mentioned in [Article II of] the Treaty are 
territorial fisheries [linked to Māori ownership of land], they have become and still remain legal 
rights".182  
Contrary to this position, however, Salmond submitted in a subsequent part of his argument 
"that non-territorial fisheries have never received any statutory establishment or recognition".183 
Regarding "non-territorial fisheries", Salmond claimed that it was, "[b]y no means clear that the 
word "fisheries" in the Treaty", meant anything other than "territorial fisheries, but whether this is so 
or not, statutory legal recognition [was] so limited".184 A marginal comment in the Solicitor-
General's handwriting recorded the view that there was "no reference to fisheries in the original 
treaty", presumably adverting to the Māori language text of the Treaty of Waitangi, which was silent 
on the specific question of fisheries. For Salmond, it was evident that non-territorial fishing rights 
were not recognised in the Native Land Act 1909 – the "[o]nly customary rights recognised by this 
Act are rights of ownership" and only the Native Land Court had the "power to transmute customary 
  
and the Treaty of Waitangi assumed that their fishing was not to be interfered with …". Paul McHugh made 
this observation in 1984 in "The Legal Status of Māori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984) 14 VUWLR 
247-273, 256. 
177  Salmond "Waipapakura v Hempton", argument, above n 153, 7. 
178  Ibid (emphasis in original). 
179  Ibid. 
180  Ibid. 
181  Ibid, 1. 
182  Ibid, 7-8. 
183  Ibid, 8. 
184  Ibid. 
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ownership into freehold".185 Indeed, he observed that a, "freehold order cannot be made in respect 
of incorporeal hereditaments".186 The typescript submission proceeded to conclude that, "[s]ince 
therefore non-territorial fishing rights [were] not recognised by [the] Native Land Act they [were] 
not brought by that Act within the exclusive jurisdiction of [the] Native Land Act".187  Were such 
rights to exist at all, in Salmond's view, then they could be taken notice of in other Courts. Given 
that observation, however, the "transformation of customary fishing rights into legal rights must be 
found in some other statute", although Salmond claimed that there were "no such statutes".188 "If 
there [were] any such statutes," Salmond argued, "they must be special Acts dealing with particular 
lands". The submissions then noted that it was "impossible to say" that there were no pieces of 
legislation but that it was "for the appellant [Waipapakura] to prove their existence".189 The 
Horowhenua Lake Act 1905 was mentioned as an illustration of an Act of Parliament that 
recognised "territorial fisheries only".190 It was in this fashion that the true sense of Salmond's 
submission that section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908 was merely a savings clause is conveyed. As 
with section 8 of the Fish Protection Act 1877, it could not, on the argument presented by Salmond, 
"transform into legal rights the rights referred to in the Treaty".191 From the perspective of the 
Solicitor-General the "recognition by statute of non-territorial rights would have necessitated an 
elaborate body of minute legislative provisions similar to the Native land legislation dealing with 
territorial rights".192 Nevertheless, "there [was] not a word of such legislation to be found in the 
statute book".193  
V LITIGATION IN THE NATIVE LAND COURT AND PROBLEMS OF LAW 
AND EVIDENCE – RIGHTS OF "EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION" AND 
RIGHTS LESS THAN OWNERSHIP 
Salmond's perspective on the Treaty of Waitangi and native title could not contain litigation in 
the Native Land Court or insulate government from the consequences of that litigation. It could, 
nevertheless, provide a basis for contesting claims that were considered unattractive from a political 
  
185  Ibid. 
186  Ibid. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Ibid. 
189  Ibid. 
190  Ibid. Section 2(a) of the Horowhenua Lake Act stated that, "The Native owners shall at all times have the 
free and unrestricted use of the lake and their fishing rights over the lake, but so as not to interfere with the 
full and free use of the lake for aquatic sports and pleasures." 
191  Ibid, 9. 
192  Ibid. 
193  Ibid. 
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perspective. In a constitutional setting that was predominantly political (not juridical), legislative 
assistance could, on occasion, be enlisted to sustain or to interpose a particular form of, or 
preference for, executive control over potentially contentious subjects. The aspiration that Salmond 
had expressed for the Tamihana Korokai appeal was that an ordinary court would resolve the 
overarching legal status of navigable inland waters. As will be seen, the foiling of that aspiration 
brought the role of the Native Land Court and political negotiation to the fore. 
The political context surrounding the proceedings in Tamihana Korokai continued to operate 
following the decision of the Court of Appeal. Between 1912 and the general election in December 
1914, Massey's government enjoyed a slight majority in the House of Representatives. A contest for 
electoral seats and political advantage was evidently at play with Ngata sensitive to any Reform 
Party charges that he was in government when the Native Land Act 1909 was enacted and seeking 
out points of political distinction. In a pre-election circular of 1914, Āpirana Ngata interpreted the 
Tamihana Korokai judgment in the following fashion: "Those Courts [sic] gave their decisions 
against the Government and the rights of the Maori people to these lakes were conserved", adding 
that the "Arawa people thus secured this right to the Maori people and this aspect of the Treaty of 
Waitangi was thus made clear."194 The piece went on to cajole Massey's administration for 
designing a "confiscatory measure" in the form of clauses in the proposed Native Land Amendment 
Bill of 1914 that would have permitted the Governor to proclaim any rivers or lakes "in respect of 
which the Native rights have not been extinguished", as reserved for "general public purposes … 
whether [the rivers or lakes were] navigable or not". A court of compensation would be constituted 
with all of the powers and jurisdiction of the Native Appellate Court. In any claim of deprivation of 
customary rights, the claimant could "apply to the Native Land Court to have all such rights defined 
and the persons entitled to compensation therefore ascertained". Herries was aware that certain Te 
Arawa had queried at a meeting at Tametekapua in Ohinemutu on 13 January 1913 whether parts of 
the Rotorua lakes might be sold or leased to the Crown. A "large Native deputation" asked the 
Minister's "opinion in regard to the money collected by the Tourist Department as revenue from the 
Rotorua lakes in view of the Court of Appeal decision recently given".195 Rogers of Te Arawa 
reportedly said that the "Natives interested desired [that] some scheme re this matter should be 
evolved, and that the question was being asked whether these lakes should be leased or sold to the 
Government".196 Ngata's circular, however, said that, "this Government did not trust the sense of 
  
194  "Summary of Hon AT Ngata's pre-election circular attached" 1, AAMK 869 Box 84b, 5/13/242, pt 4, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
195  Herries, Native Minister, to Under-secretary of Native Department, 7 February 1913, MA31, Box 26, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington. Rogers handed the Minister a memorandum "Matters to be brought 
before Hon Native Minister". The first item was headed "The Lakes" and said "Lease or sell to 
Government". 
196  Ibid. Herries reported that, "In replying, I said that so far as the Lake question was concerned I would fight 
the Natives in the Native Land Court when the question of the ownership of the Lakes is before that 
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justice of the Arawa people; it was afraid that the Natives, when possessed of these lands, would 
deal harshly with the Dominion and European tourists". Ngata claimed that:197 
[I]f it were during the term of office of the Government of Timi Kara and Ward, Timi Kara would have 
stood in the courtyards of the Arawa or the other peoples who own lakes and appealed to their sense of 
generosity as chiefs.  
Herries withdrew the proposed clauses but with statements pointing to his underlying public 
policy concern: the preservation of public space. In the critical debate with Ngata in the House of 
Representatives on 3 November 1914, Herries disagreed that the clauses were confiscatory.198 
I think the honourable member for the Eastern Maori District, and all the Natives, will admit that it 
would never do for some of the Natives to sell to a syndicate the rights of fishing or the right of 
navigation in Lake Rotorua or Lake Taupo. 
In letting the clauses go, the Minister's view was that the "public must purchase the rights of the 
Natives and that is what this clause was intended for".199  
Addressing Tamihana Korokai in a note to the Under-Secretary of Lands dated 11 June 1917, 
Salmond observed that, "an attempt was made to get the Supreme Court to determine the legal 
position of the navigable inland waters of this country in relation to Native owners".200 
"Unfortunately", he added, "it was not found possible to obtain any definite decision from that Court 
[sic] in the matter".201 As noted, the term "customary land" was defined in section 2 of the Native 
Land Act 1909 as, "land which, being vested in the Crown, is held by Natives or the descendants of 
Natives under the customs and usages of the Maori people". Salmond supposed that the Court of 
Appeal had held that the Native Land Court "had to determine in each particular case whether the 
land covered with water was Native customary land in respect of which a freehold order could be 
  
tribunal, but it would be an honourable fight and in the open, not a treacherous one, and that there would not 
be any stabbing from behind in the dark. The Native Land Court had yet to decide the ownership of these 
lakes. The decision of the Court of Appeal was to the effect that the Natives had the right to go to the Native 
Land Court and to decide the ownership. That Court may say that the bed only belonged to the Natives and 
not the water; or that the Natives owned up to a certain distance from the shore of the lake and no farther. 
That question had yet to be decided by the Court before the Natives could lease or sell." 
197  "Summary of Hon AT Ngata's pre-election circular attached" 2, above n 194. 
198  (3 November 1914) 171 NZPD 786. 
199  Ibid. "However, things can be managed in another way, and I am quite prepared to drop these clauses, as I 
admit they may cause some alarm to the Natives, though I think that alarm is unfounded [ibid]." 
200  Salmond to Under-secretary of Lands, 11 June 1917, CL174/2, 1 Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
201  Ibid. Salmond's note to the Under-secretary of Lands was erroneous in suggesting that the Supreme Court, 
as opposed to the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, effectively 
determined the case stated proceeding. 
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obtained or whether on the other hand the Natives possessed merely customary fishing rights, in 
respect of which no order could be made, as opposed to rights of native ownership which were 
capable of being transformed into freehold".202 Section 92 of the Native Land Act 1909 stipulated 
that on the investigation of title to customary land and the determination of the relative interests of 
the owners, "the [Native Land] Court shall make an order (in this Act called a freehold order) 
defining the area so dealt with, naming the persons found entitled thereto, and specifying their 
relative interests in the land". His rendition of the meaning of the Court of Appeal's ruling in the 
special case stated proceeding on appeal in Tamihana Korokai was revealing. It demonstrated an 
assumption that the Native Land Court ought to embark upon a fine evidential assessment as to 
whether Māori applicants for an investigation would have had non-territorial customary rights (such 
as certain fishing rights not tied to the underlying proprietorship of the submerged land)203 or 
"rights of native ownership" deserving a finding of "customary land" (subsequently transmuted into 
freehold status via an order of the court).204 On this premise there was a possibility that Māori 
would not satisfy the probative threshold on the evidence for a finding of "customary land status" in 
the Native Land Court. This would be viewed as a necessary implication of the concept of 
"customary land" even though the statutory language was conspicuously silent. In addition, it did 
not necessarily coincide with the ramifications of the ruling in Waipapakura in 1914 where it was 
argued that the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court extended to the investigation of title to land 
and not to the investigation of fishing rights.  
An application for the investigation of whether the bed of Lake Rotorua might be customary 
land was lodged in the Native Land Court in early 1913. As Frame has observed, Salmond was not 
especially optimistic about the possibility of success for the preferred Crown perspective in the 
wake of Tamihana Korokai.205 His concern, however, predated the filing in the Native Land Court 
in 1913 of any application for the investigation and ascertainment of title in Lake Rotorua. His 
awareness of the possibilities of failure was apparent in the immediate aftermath of the decision in 
the Court of Appeal. On 4 November 1912, less than one month following the release of the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai, Salmond clearly thought it essential to act in 
order to forestall the possibility of freehold orders being effected in respect of "lakes or rivers" 
pursuant to section 92 of the Native Land Act 1909.206 Section 100 of that statute allowed the 
  
202  Ibid. 
203  For fishing rights tied to land proprietorship see Attorney-General v Emerson [1891] AC 649 (HL). 
204  Salmond to Under-secretary of Lands, 11 June 1917, CL174/2, 1 Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
205  Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist, above n 7, 119-120. The major secondary source to date narrativising the 
overall historical question of lakes and Māori interests in such inland waters in New Zealand is White, 
above n 5. 
206  Salmond to Attorney-General, 4 November 1912, MA1 W2459, box 49, 5/13/242, pt 4 (1911-1925), Lake 
Rotorua, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
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Crown by Order-in-Council to "prohibit the Native Land Court or the Appellate Court from 
proceeding to ascertain the title to that [customary] land or to make a freehold order in respect 
thereof". He advised that an Order-in-Council be obtained under section 100 of the Native Land Act 
1909 "prohibiting the Native Land Court from investigating the title and making freehold 
orders."207 This was legal advice for the Attorney-General carefully adapted to the perceived risk 
profile for the Crown.  
e Native Land Court, Fenton.213   
 
Salmond cautioned, nevertheless, that any move to deploy the provisions of section 100 should 
only occur upon the determining by the Native Land Court of the "preliminary question whether 
such waters are by Māori custom the subject of exclusive proprietary right at all or whether on the 
other hand they are merely the subject of rights of fishing and navigation".208 This reflected the 
findings of the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai, as Stout CJ had held that an investigation of 
relevant Māori "custom" ought reveal whether the applicants, and the interests they purported to 
represent, "were and are the owners of the bed of such lake, or [alternatively] had and have merely a 
right to fish in the waters thereof".209 Salmond was encouraged in particular by the dicta of 
Edwards J in Tamihana Korokai. Justice Edwards had considered that one potential contention for 
the Crown would be that there was "no absolute right of ownership in extensive bodies of inland 
navigable waters but merely rights of fishery which would not serve as a basis for a freehold 
order."210 The Judge accepted that "it is quite possible – indeed, not improbable – that there never 
was any Maori custom or usage which recognised any greater right in land covered by navigable 
non-tidal waters than [a right to fish]".211 Each claim would have to be tested on its merits however. 
"Therefore, as Salmond correctly observed, in the Rotorua case the Court of Appeal refused to 
express any opinion leaving it to be decided on the facts by the Native Land Court".212 In 
expressing this view, it is not evident that the Crown Law Office cited or was even aware of the 
Kauwaeranga decision in 1870 of a former chief judge of th
At this stage, then, there was clearly an assumption that the Native Land Court might draw the 
distinctions that Salmond wished to convey in legal opinion work when dealing with applications 
 
207  Ibid. 
208  Ibid. 
209  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 359. 
210  Salmond to Under-secretary of Lands, 11 June 1917 5, CL174/2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
211  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 9, 351 Justice Edwards. 
212  Salmond to Under-secretary of Lands, 11 June 1917, 5, CL174/2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
213  Kauwaeranga (1870) 4 Hauraki MB 236, reprinted and annotated by Alex Frame (1984) 14 VUWLR 227; 
Parumoana (1883) 1 Wellington MB. RP Boast, "In re the Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land 
Court and the Foreshore in New Zealand Legal History" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145; F Sinclair "Kauwaeranga 
in Context" (1999) 29 VUWLR 139. 
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for the investigation of title in land. Indeed, he considered that Tamihana Korokai had fortified his 
position. In writing to the Crown Solicitor in the Lake Rotorua litigation before the Native Land 
Court on 24 October 1918, Salmond said that it was "not disputed by the Crown that the Natives 
have and always have had rights of fishing and navigation in Rotorua and other inland lakes and 
waters".214 He added that:215 
What is contended by the Crown is that these rights are rights of user only and not rights of exclusive 
ownership such as exist in respect of dry land and that therefore they cannot be made the foundation of a 
freehold order. 
Elsewhere, Salmond stated that, "No freehold order can be made in respect of mere rights of 
fishery, navigation, or other incorporeal rights."216 Salmond's written submissions prepared for the 
Native Land Court hearing in the Rotorua litigation were certainly sensitive to possible weaknesses 
in the Crown's case. He confessed that:217 
It may be suggested, however, that the Judge [Justice Edwards] means to say that if such a custom [of 
ownership of navigable waters] is proved it has necessarily been given legal validity. That the 
legislation is in all respects as wide as the Native custom and therefore that this Court could only give 
effect to that native custom by making a freehold order. The Judge, however, does not say so. This 
would be directly contrary to the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal [sic] in Waipapakura v 
Hempton to which Edwards J was himself a party. There it was held that whatever the extent of Native 
custom may be it had not been granted legal effect with respect to tidal waters. If there was such a 
custom or usage the Treaty so far as it is effective is sufficient to preserve it. How far is it effective? 
Only so far as it has been given effect to by statute. 
The historical practice of the Native Land Court was understood as primarily responsive to an 
assumption that "land" (a potentially contestable term in itself)218 had identifiable Māori 
  
214  Salmond to Prendeville, Crown Solicitor, 24 October 1918, at 2, CL174/2, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
215  Ibid. 
216  Salmond "Rotorua Case" 3, CL174/2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
217  Ibid, 10 (emphasis added). 
218  In the argument on the "Rotorua Lakes case" in 1918 this contest as to the meaning of "land" in the phrase 
"customary land" was apparent. Frederick Earl KC, arguing for the applicants for the investigation of Lake 
Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti, said, "It might be suggested that this land is not land by law, but a Lake is land 
covered by water. I presume we are not concerned as to whether Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti were or were 
not formed by Gaseation. These Lakes are according to law merely land covered with water, they would 
pass under the word 'land' [in the English language version of the Treaty of Waitangi] and certainly under 
the words properties and estates": Crown Law Office, "Lake Rotorua Case 1918, Evidence", CLI74/1, at 
fo.22 (B.16), Archives New Zealand, Wellington.  The legal argument of the Crown on this question was 
proposed as follows: "The question is therefore whether the term 'land' in the Native Land Act includes 
inland navigable waters of such a description as Taupo, Rotorua or Wakatipu. This must be determined by 
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proprietors. The transaction costs in that jurisdiction were considered to lie principally with the 
identification or ascertainment of relevant proprietors rather than a first order inquiry into the overall 
evidential and legal quality and degree of connection to the land. That is, the identification of "who" 
held the relative interests in a certain area or parcel of land as opposed to whether the interests per se 
were of a type equivalent to a certain conception of "ownership" that would lead to freehold legal 
status. The Crown, however, in contesting an application, however, would generate an evidential 
approach that was directed as much to the weighting of the customary interest in a specific judicial 
forum; in essence, whether the relative relationship to a resource amounted to "rights of native 
ownership" or, alternatively, a class of non-territorial rights. The active engagement of the Crown 
altered the dynamic of the proceeding in requiring the question as to the legal status of the ongoing 
connection of applicants to a lake was equivalent to "ownership" to be tested through the 
presentation of evidence and argument. 
Salmond had expressly introduced the parlance of "territorial rights" to New Zealand litigation 
on fisheries in the context of Waipapakura v Hempton in argument on 9 July 1914. This conceptual 
divide, deployed in Salmond's legal submissions in that case, was premised upon a corresponding 
distinction that had materialized in the third edition of the English treatise by the London-based 
barristers, Coulson and Forbes, which addressed The Law relating to Waters, Sea, Tidal and Inland 
and was published in 1910. The first edition, issued in 1880, had also used the sundering between 
territorial rights of fishing and, implicitly, those that were not of that class. "We shall make use of 
the words territorial fishery to define that kind of several and exclusive fishery arising from and 
connected with the ownership of the soil in non-tidal waters".219 Another prominent text, resorted to 
in New Zealand at this time, Halsbury's Laws of England, preferred the phrase "corporeal fishery" 
in opposition to one that was "incorporeal", although Salmond's use of the respected work of 
Coulson and Forbes admitted the alternative vocabulary, based on "territoriality", to New Zealand 
jurisprudence. In the barrister Hubert Stuart Moore's chapter on "Fisheries" in Halsbury's Laws of 
England a fishery that was characterised as "corporeal" denoted one that was united with the 
proprietorship of the underlying land so that the right to fish would ordinarily be regarded as an 
inheritance with the submerged land – "the right of fishing being a profit of the soil like the grass of 
the land".220 This divide between a "territorial" and "non-territorial" class of rights proved to be 
very serviceable in the New Zealand context, albeit at a rather generic, broad analytical level.221 
  
reference to the purpose and subject matter of the Native land legislation": Crown Law Office, "Rotorua 
Case", undated, 1918(?), CL174/2, 10, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
219  Coulson and Forbes, above n 175, 337 (emphasis in original). 
220  Moore "Fisheries" The Laws of England, Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law of England by 
Right Honourable the Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 1885-86, 1886-92, and 
1895-1905, & other lawyers (vol 14, Butterworth & Co, London, 1910) 572. 
 JOHN SALMOND AND NATIVE TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND 897 
That is, the particular forms of fishery and fishing right described in Coulson and Forbes' text found, 
in general, no corresponding echo in the legal regime regarding fisheries in New Zealand. It was, 
moreover, a conceptual classification that had a genealogical thread running back to the 1830 
volume of the Law of Waters by Woolrych.222 According to the 1880 edition of The Law relating to 
Waters, Sea, Tidal and Inland, the English common law contemplated the possibility of four 
principal types or categories of fishery, specifically a "common fishery", a "several fishery", a "free 
fishery" and a "common of fishery". Much complexity attended each classification. A "several 
fishery" was described as a "right of fishing in a particular place exclusive of all others" and existed 
prima facie in the proprietor of the soil of non-tidal waters, in which case it could be called a 
"territorial fishery.223 The owner of a several fishery, whether owner of the soil or not, [could] 
maintain trespass for breaking his several fishery and taking his fish, and has a privileged property 
in the fish before they are caught."224 The authors commented on the ambiguous use of the term 
"free fishery". Confusion had arisen over its use to "express a several fishery in a public river" 
whereas the key distinction between a "several fishery" and a "free fishery" was said to be that the 
latter was a "fishery in a certain place, not exclusive, but co-extensive with the rights of others".225 
  
221  It would consciously re-appear in McHugh "The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters", 
above n 176, 257, in 1984 (directly calling upon Salmond's use of the phraseology in Waiapapakura v 
Hempton) and in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer in 1986 (reported in [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC)). By 
that decade, the analysis had altered considerably. Justice Williamson in the High Court said at 692 that: "I 
note that the customary right contended for in this case is not based upon ownership of land or upon an 
exclusive right to a foreshore or bank of a river. In that sense this claim is a "non territorial" one. The 
customary right involved has not been expressly extinguished by statute and I have not discovered or been 
referred to any adverse legislation or procedure which plainly and clearly extinguishes it. It is a right limited 
to the Ngai Tahu tribe and its authorised relatives for personal food supply. It differs significantly from the 
rights contended for in the Weepu and Keepa decisions. So far as the Waipapakura decision is concerned I 
note that there is no suggestion of any set nets or structures in the soil of the foreshore and no exclusive 
right is contended for in this case."  
222  Refer to Woolrych The Law of Waters and of Sewers (London 1830) 87: "A right of any kind, means, in 
strict language, a profit or easement, which is enjoyed in the soil of another; and thus, when we speak of a 
right of fishery, we mean the liberty of fishing in the water of another; and it has been so defined. When, 
therefore, we discover that the soil over which the stream runs, and the water itself, belong to the same 
person, we do not say correctly that such an individual has a right of fishery, because the land and the profits 
are so completely identified as his inheritance, that they cannot be separated. If any description be applied to 
it, it should be that of territorial fishing, because the party has the dominion over the territory or land itself". 
223  Coulson and Forbes, above n 175, 338. 
224  Ibid (citing Holford v Bailey (1849) 13 QB 426 and Child v Greenhill (1639) Cro Car 553). 
225  Ibid. 
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VI IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY FOR CROWN EVIDENTIAL METHOD AND 
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT 
Theory also implied certain practical consequences for methodological approaches to evidence. 
Section 100 of the Native Land Act 1909 was no longer available, having been repealed in 1913.226 
In 1918, against the background of applications to the Native Land Court relating to Lake Rotorua, 
Lake Waikaremoana and the inner harbour of Napier, Salmond and the Department of Lands and 
Survey attempted to obtain ministerial interest in having it reinstated. They failed. Attorney-General 
Francis Bell noted that Salmond's view of the utility of section 100 "assumes that the very arbitrary 
power conferred upon the Government by that section would be always properly used".227 He said 
that, "Whether that assumption can be properly made is a matter not for lawyers but for Parliament". 
His view, "as a member of Parliament and of the Government is that it is in general not wise or safe 
to confer upon the Government such arbitrary powers as were exercisable under section 100." He 
doubted whether "it was a fair power to assume", having regard to the "obligation of the New 
Zealand Government to the Natives arising not only from the Treaty of Waitangi but from the whole 
course of the assumption of sovereignty by the Crown in New Zealand". The risk of arbitrariness 
was real as those obligations were "not capable of accurate definition and may be construed by one 
public man or class of public men in a different sense from that adopted by others". On this 
occasion, the Treaty was deployed as a means to condition political and legal discussion within the 
Crown. Bell concurred, however, with Salmond's view that "sections 85, 86 and 87 of the Native 
Land Act, 1909, are essential provisions for the protection of title to land in New Zealand". The 
Attorney-General stated that:228 
If after the Crown has granted land or assumed possession and granted a tenancy in land it can be 
alleged in any Court that the Native title has not been extinguished, it is obvious that the root to title in 
land in New Zealand would be not the grant of the Crown but the proof of due cession by the customary 
Native owners to the Crown. 
The Native Minister, Herries, agreed with Bell on the question of section 100:229 
  
226  Frame discusses the circumstances of its repeal briefly in Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist, above n 1, 119-
121. Section 100 provided that: "In respect of any area of customary land the Governor may, at any time and 
for any reason which he thinks fit, by Order in Council prohibit the Native Land Court or the Appellate 
Court from proceeding to ascertain the title to that land or to make a freehold order in respect thereof; and 
no freehold order made in breach of any such prohibition shall be of any force or effect."  
227  Bell, Attorney-General, to Herries, Native Minister (27 August 1918) AA05 W3562 22/1750, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington.  
228  Ibid (emphasis added). 
229  Herries, Native Minister, to Minister of Lands (4 September 1918) AA05 W3562 22/1750, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington. He noted that, "Both the Solicitor-General and Mr Hawthorne are very properly, from 
their point of view, zealous to preserve the interests of the Crown, but the Minister who prepares legislation 
and Cabinet and Parliament that approve of such legislation, must take a wider view, and the interests, not 
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I would like to add that a careful study of the judgments delivered by the Judges who sat in the Court of 
Appeal in 1912, in the case of Tamahana [sic] Korokai v The Solicitor-General, commonly known as 
"the Lakes Case" and a due consideration of the able exposition of the rights of the Crown and of the 
Natives arising from the Treaty of Waitangi and subsequent legislation, and of the judgments of the 
Privy Council and other Courts, convinced me that the Crown would have to retire from the politically 
untenable position contained in section 100.  
He concluded that he was "satisfied that no Native Minister, with all the knowledge of the rights 
of the Natives, as shown in the judgments previously mentioned, would have been justified in 
advising His Excellency to put section 100 into operation".230  
In the absence of a specific statutory provision, such as section 100 Crown legal strategy was 
left with contesting claims in the courts or in promoting particular legislative solutions to contain the 
consequences of litigation. First, evidence of public (non-claimant) use of land and resources would 
be deployed to challenge Māori narratives of, say, continuous use and connection in the Native Land 
Court based on "custom" and "usage". Thus, conduct or events that could be characterised as 
exogenous to a descent group, such as a given hapū, could, in turn, be interpreted as sufficiently 
adverse or intrusive to represent an absence of "exclusivity" on the part of the claimants or as 
something that would compromise "exclusivity" if it had been established as having existed. The 
Crown Law Office was, therefore, addressing the issue of the co-existence of increasingly 
noticeable governmental activities and of non-claimant third parties with pre-existing Māori 
populations in the context of the relevant native land legislation. 
This sort of evidence was potentially complicated however. Although presented as potentially 
adverse to customary claims, it might, paradoxically, be construed as consistent with those claims if 
the quantity of such material was minimal or the intensity of activities it described was relatively 
moderate and intermittent. The litigation in the Native Land Court at Rotorua in the "Rotorua Lakes 
case" proved to be illustrative of this vulnerability. These proceedings were set against the 
background of at least seventeen distinct applications in the Native Land Court for the investigation 
and ascertainment of statutorily recognised customary land, if any, in sixteen named lakes in the 
vicinity of the settlement at Rotorua.231 A "lakes committee" was formed to manage the 
  
only of the Crown, but also of the subject must be considered, and the subject's rights must be carefully 
preserved as those of the Crown, and in a democratic country the benefit of any doubt should always be 
given to the subject." 
230  Ibid. 
231  See The New Zealand Gazette 23 May 1918, at 2049 recording the notice or panui of 14 May 1918 
(Registrar's Office, Rotorua) for the hearing in the Native Land Court at Rotorua of applications for the 
investigation of titles in "Ngakaro Lake, Ngahewa Lake, Okareka Lake, Okataina Lake, Opouri Lake, 
Rerewhakaitu Lake, Rotokakahi Lake, Rotomahana Lake, Rotehu Lake, Rotoma, Tahunaroa, Tarawera 
Lake, Tikitapu Lake, Tutaeinanga Lake". 
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applications and to assist in raising funds for the conduct of the proceedings. Mōrehu Te Kirikau 
was chair of that committee and had written upon the lodging of the thirteen applications in 
April 1918 requesting Judge Wilson to "requisition the Chief Surveyor to prepare Sketch Plans 
certified by him as sufficient for the purposes of the Native Land Court and so that these plans will 
be available when the Lakes Claim is placed before the Court".232 These inland waters included 
lakes such as Rotoiti, Rotorua, Ōkataina, Ōkareka, Rotomahana, Opouri (Ngāpouri), Tarawera and 
Rotomā. The notice or panui dated 14 May 1918 signalled that a collection of fourteen applications 
were to be heard at the Native Land Court in Rotorua on 19 June 1918, "or as soon thereafter as the 
business of the Court will allow". The remaining three applications – those to Lake Rotorua and 
Lake Rotoiti – had been notified previously. The initial notification in The New Zealand Gazette for 
Rotorua-nui a Kahu had been 28 April 1917 although the Crown Law Office was aware of an earlier 
application that the Registrar of the Native Land Court had notified in May 1913 (but was not 
pursued at that time).233 The Native Land Court began to hear the applications relating to Lake 
Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti on 16 October 1918.  
 
Elements within official circles expressed some anxiety regarding the applications. On 
27 May 1918, the Chief Surveyor and Commissioner of Crown Lands at the Auckland district office 
of the Department of Lands and Survey, H M Skeet, informed the Under-Secretary of Lands in 
Wellington that the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court had advised that an application had been 
recently lodged with the Native Land Court for the investigation of the title to Lake Ōkataina. This 
lake was described as a "comparatively small lake situated a few miles east of Lake Rotorua and 
south of Lake Rotoiti, and [was] entirely surrounded by the subdivisions of the Okataina block 
belonging to the Ngatitirawahi Hapu of the Arawa Tribe".234 He understood that "the applicants, for 
whom Mr Earle [sic], KC is acting, want to bring this case before the Court as a 'test'".235 Yet, the 
report observed that the, "Crown does not appear, except in a minor degree, to have exercised any 
rights of ownership over this Lake and the Crown's claim, unless supported by a legal decision that 
all navigable waters belong to the Crown, would I am afraid be rather difficult to uphold or 
prove".236 He continued in saying that, "In fact, of all the Lakes in this particular District, this one 
in particular which the Natives claim, would appear to be in the most favorable [sic] aspect and give 
them the best possible chance of success, and conversely, the Crown a feeble chance of refuting 
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it."237 Salmond was certainly alive to the possibilities of failure and the need for compensation.  
In 1917 he advised that:238 
It ought to be possible, however, to make some arrangement with the [Native Land] Court by which, if 
the decision is against the Crown, the making of an actual freehold order should be deferred, in order to 
give the Government and Parliament an opportunity of considering the whole question and making 
provision for the compensation of the Natives in lieu of the actual issue of freehold titles to the waters in 
question. 
The tactical frame for the anticipated litigation in the Native Land Court was much appreciated. 
The Chief Surveyor suggested that it was "on these grounds that the claim to this Lake is being 
selected by the applicants as a Test Case, instead of Lakes Rotorua and Rotoiti, and if successful, 
they would use it as a lever to obtain favorable [sic] decisions in other cases".239 Accordingly, he 
opined that it, "would suit the Crown far better to take either Lakes Rotorua or Rotoiti, or both 
together as "test Cases" and I therefore beg to suggest that every endeavour should be made to 
prevent the Okataina case being used, and if possible, from advertised in the Panui".240 This latter 
suggestion was redundant, as the application regarding Lake Ōkataina had already been notified in 
The New Zealand Gazette let alone the relevant panui of the Native Land Court. Skeet 
acknowledged, however, that, should the panui have already been printed, "it would be as well to 
bring the altered condition of affairs before the Solicitor-General's notice, so that he can instruct as 
to the necessary action to be taken."241 He recommended that Salmond direct the Crown Solicitor, 
James Prendeville, to proceed to Auckland to avail himself of the information at the Department of 
Lands and Survey there. Skeet had been informed that Te Rangihiroa Buck had visited Rotorua 
under "instructions from the Native Department in connection with the Natives' claims to the Lakes, 
and that he visited all the Lakes with representatives from the different Hapus and he prepared a 
map shewing [sic] the claims made to different fishing grounds by the various hapus."242 The 
Crown Law Office managed to persuade counsel for the applicants to proceed with the application 
to Lake Rotorua in the first instance. That said, at the commencement of the hearing in the Native 
Land Court in Rotorua on 16 October 1918, counsel for the applicants, Earl, was able to secure 
agreement before the court that the Lake Rotoiti application would be considered simultaneously. 
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Prendeville objected to Earl's gathering together of the Lake Rotoiti and Lake Rotorua applications 
on the first day of the proceeding but failed to prevent Earl's approach.  
Lake Rotorua had been proclaimed a "harbour" within the meaning of the Harbours Act 1878 on 
18 January 1906.243 In that year, regulations were issued for controlling water-borne traffic on Lake 
Rotoiti and Lake Rotorua and the management of wharves. Provision was also made for charging 
dues for the use of harbour works. The administering public service department was the Department 
of Tourist and Health Resorts.244 Navigation and the regulation of Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti 
as harbours emerged as an evidential issue relevant to the litigation in 1918 before the Native Land 
Court concerning whether the two lakes would have the status of "customary land" under section 2 
of the Native Land Act 1909. The Crown Law Office requested that the Department of Tourist and 
Health Resorts and the Department of Lands and Survey furnish evidence of Crown and non-
claimant third party use and occupation of the two lakes with a view to establishing that the 
applicants in the Native Land Court proceedings could not establish the requisite exclusivity or that 
it had been fatally compromised, if it had ever existed. W Hill, the Tourist Agent at the Government 
Tourist Bureau in Rotorua was a source of information in the form of a concise communiqué 
addressing the status of Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti as proclaimed harbours. E F Hawthorne and 
Raleigh John Knight of the Department of Lands and Survey supplied extensive assistance in 
researching the official record for evidence of non-claimant third party use together with Crown-
sponsored or governmental interaction with the Rotorua district lakes. Knight was based in 
Auckland.  To assist the case in the Native Land Court in 1918, Hawthorne, a clerk in the head 
office of the Department of Lands and Survey, would produce a succinct typescript paper entitled 
"Acts of Crown and public user on Lake Rotorua". It indicated the possibility of the Crown calling 
seven witnesses attesting to various historical and contemporaneous aspects of navigation and the 
construction of marine structures, such as wharves, that occupied space within Lake Rotorua 
itself.245 In certain instances, the witnesses would testify as to the absence of protest or objection 
from Māori. Thomas Fitzgerald, a foreman-carpenter in the Tourist Department office at Rotorua 
was one example. It was proposed that he would testify to the erection of a stone wharf in 1898 and 
to its wooden extension in the absence of any "objection or protest [of the] Natives, who were fully 
aware of [the] progress of the work."246 
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In a letter dated 5 October 1918 to Prendeville, the Crown Solicitor acting on the "Rotorua 
Lakes case", Hawthorne confessed that the247 
Crown [had] certainly built wharves, introduced fish ova, charged license [sic] fees for fishing, launches 
&c. and generally used the lake as if it were public property, but the question we shall have to answer 
will be: By what authority did the Crown do those things? 
He expressed some dissatisfaction at the meagre volume of fresh material discovered on the 
Crown's use of the lakes in spite of the considerable amount of time he had expended on research. 
Hawthorne, an informed civil servant in the employ of the Wellington office of the Department of 
Lands and Survey said that "the use of the Lake by the Crown or the public is insignificant in 
comparison with the use of the Lake by the Natives from time immemorial, and personally I cannot 
see that evidence of public user is going to help us much".248 It seemed to Hawthorne that while it 
was "of course impossible to anticipate the actual nature of the Natives' case … [he had] little doubt 
that they [would] attempt to throw the onus of proof of ownership on the Crown".249 In 
Hawthorne's view, "as a mere layman", the Crown would be obliged to rely mainly on two 
considerations. First, that "according to Native custom there is not and never has been any tribal 
ownership of the inland waters of [New Zealand]"; adding that he adhered to this view 
"notwithstanding the apparently opposite opinion expressed in the judgment in Tamihana Korokai v 
The Solicitor General."250 He alleged that the practice of the Native Land Court in relation to the 
investigation of lands surrounding the lakes supported his view. Hence, Hawthorne claimed the 
extracts from Native Land Court minute books, which Knight had forwarded to Prendeville, 
indicated that, "although the natives stated that their "lands" extended to certain posts or stakes in 
the Lake, the Court made orders only with respect to the lands bounded by the actual water of the 
Lake".251 This opinion was not strictly accurate. Prendeville would be, or would have become 
aware by 18 October 1918 at the latest, that several blocks the subject of orders and certificates of 
title in the Native Land Court had included parts of lakes or entire lakes, or had been purchased by 
the Crown, including Lake Opouri (Ngāpouri), and Ngahewa. Lake Opouri or Ngāpouri had been 
proclaimed Crown land in The New Zealand Gazette on 2 November 1915 in the wake of a 
resolution on the part of its proprietors to sell the parcel of approximately 2,509 acres (which 
included the lake according to the relevant plans).252 Irrespective of that, a distinct application for 
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the investigation of title dated 20 April 1918 was filed by Mita Taupopoki and three other 
individuals in respect of "Opouri Lake". In his correspondence to Prendeville, however, Hawthorne 
chose to ignore such precedents, assuming, that is, he was indeed aware of them. He continued this 
with the comment that, "All talk of native 'mana' over the Lake is nonsense: 'mana' is a purely 
personal thing, and does not apply to either land or water".253 Hawthorne's second point was that 
the "only rights of native tribes or hapus [sic] over the Lake itself are rights of fishing".254 On this 
supposition, Hawthorne advised Prendeville to review notes he had attached from Elsdon Best. Best 
had translated a passage that appeared to him to look "like claiming the land under waters of [a] 
lake, but the idea in a Maori's mind would undoubtedly be associated with, not the submerged land, 
but the food supply in the waters".255 In making a history of public law, therefore, care should 
always be taken with the use of the term "Crown" preceded by the definite article "the". As I have 
noted before, there is a danger in failing to disaggregate the notion of "the Crown" and to ignore the 
diverse range of its inter-departmental interests and motivations.256 The participation of Hawthorne, 
an informed layperson, has already been noted in terms of the preparation of evidence for the 
"Rotorua Lakes case" in the Native Land Court and his assessment of the potential arguments.  
 
Hawthorne's proposal was that the:257 
Crown should admit unreservedly that the Natives' right to fish [and] other foods in lakes &c is beyond 
dispute, [and] should emphasise the fact that this is the only kind of claim to the Lake that has any 
validity.  
In the margin, however, Prendeville recorded the following terse comment against Hawthorne's 
proposition of the lakes being the sites for fishing rights and not title: "No. See notes of Sir John 
[Salmond] – no fishing rights recognised by N[ative] L[and] Act".  Hawthorne would also bring an 
earlier Crown Law Office legal opinion of the Assistant Law Officer, Hubert Ostler, dated 13 March 
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1911 to the attention of Prendeville in the specific context of outlining a possible legal strategy.258 
Salmond and Ostler would appear on behalf of the Crown in the Court of Appeal's hearing of 
Tamihana Korokai in July 1912. In referring to Ostler's legal advice of 1911, Hawthorne 
acknowledged that, while it may be of interest to Prendeville, it could be superseded by the 
Solicitor-General's views should there be any inconsistency. Still, Hawthorne used Ostler's historical 
advice as indicative of a number of legal issues that might arise, specifically that of usque ad 
medium filum aquae ("to the middle of the water"). This well-known, rebuttable presumption at 
common law provided that where a non-tidal river was expressed to be the boundary of a riparian 
parcel of adjacent land, the proprietor of the parcel was presumed to have legal title to the middle 
line of the abutting riverbed. Ostler would have been aware that courts in New Zealand had recently 
accepted the applicability of the ad medium filum aquae presumption. In April 1905, the Court of 
Appeal had ruled in The King v Joyce that the common law presumption had become part of the law 
of the colony at its foundation.259 Whether, however, the presumption might extend to significant 
inland waters, such as large lakes, remained indeterminate.260 One agreed statement of fact between 
the parties on the case stated for Tamihana Korokai in 1912 was that Lake Rotorua was "an inland 
non-tidal lake situated in the North Island of New Zealand, about seven miles and half in length and 
six miles in breadth".261 It was also admitted in that special case stated that various parcels of land 
adjacent to the lake were "Native customary land, other portions [were] Crown Land, other portions 
[were] held in freehold title by Europeans, and the residue [was] Native freehold land". Hawthorne 
noted that, "(on the gospel according to Ostler) the rule would also apply to the island of Mokoia [in 
the centre of Lake Rotorua], and radiating lines w[oul]ld run from the island to the shores of the lake 
intersect the converging lines from the shores of the lake to its imaginary non-existent 'centre'".262 
He characterized this conundrum as, "a metaphysical puzzle, worthy of the ancient Church 
Fathers!"263 In 1911 Ostler had surmised that, in respect of Lake Rotorua, if, "as is probably the 
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case", the adjacent dry land had been investigated in the Native Land Court and "freehold titles 
issued for it to different owners", then the most that a possible owner of such different of such land 
could claim would possibly be a "title to the bed [of the lake] fronting the blocks he was interested 
to the middle line of the Lake".264 Ostler had also revealed the expectation of at least one member 
of the Crown Law Office that Tamihana Korokai would authoritatively settle the "question as to 
who are the owners of the bed". Ostler additionally set out the "difficult question of mixed law and 
fact of whether there was a public right of navigation on the lake … depending upon an implied 
dedication of that right by the owners of the bed of the Lake".265 He acknowledged that this was the 
"very question in the action [then] pending before the Supreme Court [in the Tamihana Korokai 
proceeding]".266 The particular view of Ostler on navigation was led less by the initial proclamation 
of Lake Rotorua as a "harbour" pursuant to the Harbours Act 1878 than by a sense that the 
application of the English common law position on public rights of navigation would affect the legal 
situation within New Zealand. That is, Ostler concluded that if there were no public rights of 
navigation on Lake Rotorua when the harbour regulations were promulgated, then the regulations 
were "ultra vires and invalid".267 There is collateral evidence to suggest that Salmond did indeed 
disagree with Ostler's viewpoint on the application of ad medium filum to Lake Rotorua. 
Strategically, Salmond would seek to focus the Crown case on producing evidence regarding the use 
of Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti by Māori and others for navigation and fishing. This course was 
pursued with a view to presenting legal submissions that would argue that navigation and fishing 
constituted the customary rights that the relevant hapū of Te Arawa exercised in fact and law rather 
than rights tantamount to customary ownership of the lake bed (and hence the space occupied by the 
water column, as well as the airspace above, with practical consequences, in Salmond's opinion, for 
public rights of navigation and fishing in general).268 
In the first edition of The Law Relating to Waters, Sea, Tidal and Inland the authors said that, 
"There seems little doubt but that the public may acquire a right of navigation in a non-tidal lake in 
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the same way as on a non-tidal river".269 Thus, the text noted that, "Though rivers above the flux 
and reflux of the tide are primâ facie private rivers, yet the public may acquire a right or easement to 
navigate such waters by express grant, or dedication by immemorial user, which presumes a grant, 
or by an Act of Parliament",270 an expression reminiscent of Ostler's conception of navigation in 
non-tidal lakes. The library of the Crown Law Office in Wellington received a copy of this 
particular edition on 11 June 1907.271 There is no evidence directly indicative of Ostler's reliance on 
this text.272 As noted, however, Salmond would use the third edition (released in 1910) in support 
of his submissions in Waipapakura in July 1914.273 The second edition of 1902 would be actively 
deployed in conjunction with the first edition of Halsbury's Laws of England in the litigation of 
Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti. Indeed, Earl would cite the work of Coulson and Forbes, as well as 
the section by the London barrister, Hubert Stuart Moore,274 on "Water and Watercourses" 
appearing in the twenty-eighth volume of Halsbury's Laws of England,275 in adapting the ad 
medium filum aquae presumption to each of Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti respectively. Moore's 
entries concerning the proprietorship of the soil in respect of lakes and pools were less equivocal 
than the relevant extracts on inland waters from the contribution of Coulson and Forbes. Moore 
stated, for instance, that the "soil of lakes and pools, even when they are so large that they might be 
termed inland seas, does not of common right belong to the Crown, and the law as to the ownership 
of the soil is the same as that applied to inland non-tidal waters whatever the size of the water space 
may be".276 Also available to the legal advisors for the Crown, however, was the seminal text on 
water and watercourses in the United States, namely the 1877 edition of the work of Joseph Angell 
– A Treatise on the Law of Watercourses with an appendix, containing statutes of flowing, and 
forms of declarations.277 The date of accession of this volume in the Crown Law Office library was 
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recorded as 11 May 1880. The legal position on navigable lakes in the United States proved to be of 
some importance to Salmond's argument, at least by way of exploration. In his proposed 
submissions for the Lake Rotorua case before the Native Land Court, Salmond wrote that the278 
[Q]uestion is simply whether the water is so large and the interest of public navigation and user so great 
as to form a reasonable basis for the assumption that the Crown or the Legislature did not intend the 
word "land" to include such waters.  
He added that the "distinction between navigable and non-navigable inland waters is repeatedly 
drawn in America and is found quite practicable".279 
In addition, Native Land Court judges were also beginning to wrestle with these possibilities. In 
1916 Chief Judge Jackson Palmer had cautioned Judge Jones that he foresaw "a terrible lot of 
stumbling blocks" before the judge's investigation of the boundary between Tuhoe and Ngāti 
Kahungunu interests in Lake Waikaremoana.280 Thus, the "title to all the lands surrounding the 
Lake having been ascertained already, will not the Lake have to be taken as a distinct block in itself 
and not as an appearance to any land".281 The Chief Judge queried whether this would not be "quite 
new and foreign to English Law – can you show a precedent anywhere where a fee simple title has 
been issued for lake or a river without any dry land to support the title".282 He noted that if, "it were 
a fishing grant I could understand it but we have no power to issue a right of piscary".283 The Chief 
Judge was sensitive to the fact that if proprietorship to land adjacent to Lake Waikaremoana carried 
"the common law title to the middle of the lake then is not the Crown the owner of the Southern and 
Eastern half of the Lake and the Maoris owners of the rest".284 "If that were the case", said the 
Chief Judge, "is not the title to the Lake already ascertained and has it not therefore ceased to be 
papatupu [customary land] and so where is your right to again investigate it?"285 The enormity of 
the potential issue was evident to Palmer. "If the boundary of the land adjoining a lake or river stops 
dead at the bank, then there must be a lot of uninvestigated land in New Zealand consisting of rivers 
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and lakes and will we have to commence and investigate each of these separately, and have we not 
been wrong all along in the Land Court in not making such investigations before".286 Palmer 
revealed uncertainty concerning the evidence required: "How were the waters and bottom of the 
lake occupied and by whom? Was it by fishing and as a highway over the surface or by what 
acts?"287 Legal and evidential indeterminacy prevailed. 
 
In his notes prepared for argument in Tamihana Korokai, Salmond stated that the "Native Land 
Court has nothing to do with technical rules of English law and no jurisdiction to apply such rules to 
the customs and usages of the Natives".288 Salmond, the established jurist, was certainly familiar 
with Romanistic legal sources and the English common law. The presumption of usque ad medium 
filum aquae, which was "an artificial and technical rule of law imported into the Common Law from 
the Civil Law", could not have any application to Māori customs and usages. Salmond did not pause 
to contemplate the degree to which the complicated interaction of the Native Land Court with the 
Māori populations in various proceedings might have generated a re-shaping of such conceptions of 
"custom" at law, especially in circumstances where novel questions regarding custom and usages 
and proprietary interests might be posed for certain landscapes, including inland waters and the 
foreshore. Salmond's approach implied, somewhat mechanistically and hopefully, the recovery of 
ancient "customs and usages" somehow unaffected by (or insulated from) the incoming common 
law in judicial forums, such as the Native Land Court, or in the arguments of professional legal 
representatives trained in English common law. Salmond was concerned with the pleading in the 
statement of claim in Tamihana Korokai that the customary proprietors with parcels having a 
frontage upon Lake Rotorua became owners of the bed to its centre point by virtue of the operation 
of the presumption of usque ad medium filum aquae and the Native Land Act 1894, by which 
"customary land" status was transformed into freehold status. Paragraph 25(a) of the special case 
stated, pursuant to rule 245 in those proceedings, claimed that "the bed of the Lake or some part 
thereof is land held in freehold tenure by those Natives as accessory to their freehold title to land 
adjoining the bed and is included by implication of law in the Native Land Court Certificates of 
Title which have been issued as aforesaid and in the freehold titles obtained by virtue of these 
Certificates of Title".289 This argument was run in Tamihana Korokai. The counter-argument for 
Salmond would be that the "certificates of title [were] in themselves not grants at all but mere 
judicial declarations of the existence of customary title", with the qualification that, "[t]hey gave no 
freehold title until 1894".290 As such, titles fronting the lake could not "extend further than the land 
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where the title is actually investigated [-] the bed of the lake was never investigated."291 Earl 
repeated the argument in the Native Land Court in 1918. He also cited the cases of Bristow v 
Cormican292 and Johnston v O'Neill293 in support of the common law proposition that riparian 
owners along lakes might have ad medium filum rights to lakebeds.294 
At this remove it is difficult to determine to what extent Earl's tactical move to use ad medium 
filum, specifically informed by imported English and imperial common law sources, constituted a 
core part in the legal presentation of the case to which Earl subsequently fastened the oral testimony 
of his witnesses from various hapū of Te Arawa dwelling within the vicinity of the two lakes. 
Conversely, it remains complicated to assess whether the pre-litigation views of these witnesses 
would have indeed aligned so neatly and comfortably with the common law presumption of usque 
ad medium filum aquae and the conception of proprietorship in submerged land, which it necessarily 
entails. As at 1918, it is not evident to what extent the two streams of perspective might have been 
actively entwined, or whether the availability of congenial common law authority influenced the 
presentation not only of legal argument but also of evidence, as the preferred legal stance of the 
operational public service departments and the Crown Law Office did so for "the Crown". It remains 
unclear whether this form of engagement with the court's peculiar practices was viewed as 
unpalatable or alien to the observer's gaze but as a process to be tolerated and gone through 
nevertheless. Alternatively, it is difficult to ascertain whether the processes and vocabulary of the 
Native Land Court were considered sufficiently familiar and even somewhat useful to some, if not 
necessarily all, of the Te Arawa participants in 1918 that it could be regarded as a part of a dynamic 
customary milieu, appropriated, modified and translated into novel forms of interpretation through 
ongoing interaction with the court and representatives of government. The evidence, such as it is, 
would suggest the reasonableness of the latter interpretation.295 The Court had been operating in the 
vicinity of the lakes since at least 1881. It was not an unknown creature. Interaction with the 
processes of the Court encouraged the construction of certain ways of seeing and explaining the 
landscape (whether featuring water or not), as reflected in discussions before the Native Land Court 
in relation to what Salmond would perceive as local "custom". That is, the processes of the Native 
  
291  Ibid (emphasis in original). 
292  Bristow v Cormican (1878) 3 App Cas 641. 
293  Johnston v O'Neill [1911] AC 552. 
294  "Lake Rotorua Case 1918, Evidence", CL174/1, fos.98-106, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
295  There is of course an ongoing debate concerning the historiography (such as it is) of the Native Land Court 
in the context of contemporary claims before the Waitangi Tribunal. See Grant Young "A Short History of 
Post-Treaty Māori Custom Relating to Land" and Michael Belgrave "The Tribunal and the Past: Taking a 
Roundabout Path to a New History" in M Belgrave, M Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi 
Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005); and 
Lyndsay Head Land, Authority and the Forgetting of Being in Early Colonial Māori History (PhD Thesis, 
University of Canterbury, 2006) 105-130, for instance. 
 JOHN SALMOND AND NATIVE TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND 911 
Land Court and the modalities of speaking in that forum, as well as the identity and nature of issues 
(claims to land as "customary") could be seen, over time, as increasingly localised and "indigenised" 
to an extent if not completely. The statutory language generated a market in evidence on custom 
about ties to the landscape described as proprietary (or potentially so).  
Management of the claim against the Crown in the Native Land Court required a degree of legal 
and evidential co-ordination. Before the adjournment of the proceedings on 1 November 1918, Earl 
called two witnesses in addition to Mair: Wiremu Maihi ("William Marsh") Ereatara and Tieri Te 
Tikao (the original named plaintiff in the companion proceeding to Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-
General). Both individuals had, for instance, provided evidence in Native Land Court proceedings 
before Judge Johnson in relation to the Rotoiti land block in the period from 25 July 1899 until 19 
December 1900.296 Ereatara in that proceeding was recorded as saying of his own claims to land 
adjacent to the lake that his boundary began at "Ngakaho on the shore of Lake Rotoiti; thence it runs 
inland …".297 Quite clearly, the hapū witnesses presenting evidence on behalf of the applicants 
could recite the formula of so-called take or the basis of claims to space, whether in respect of 
submerged land or elsewhere.298 Hence, the transcript of the Native Land Court proceedings for 
Lake Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti in 1918 housed scattered references to the rather conventional 
categories of the underlying "customary" causes or take of claims to authority and proprietorship 
under consideration in the litigation ("land held by Māori"): "conquest", "occupation", and "gift". 
Tikao characterized the rights of Ngāti Pikiao to Rotoiti as based upon the take of "conquest".299 
These classifications were not specifically tied to the personalised authority of a rangatira (or 
chieftain) but to narratives of the relevant collective descent group, such as hapū. One witness 
would present a variety of relevant grounds for claims to pre-eminence and something 
approximating to possessory "title" in the sense of exclusive possession.  
The suspicion of legal counsel for the Crown in the "Lake Rotorua" proceedings, and certain of 
its official advisors, was that the witness evidence in support of the application of the presumption 
of usque ad medium filum aquae was contrived. Prendeville thought that the Presiding Judge had 
not unreservedly accepted the assertion of the applicants that Lake Rotorua was divided amongst 
several hapū. On 26 October 1918 he reported to Salmond that Gilbert Mair, a principal witness for 
  
296  See Native Land Court, Maketu Minute Book 17, 294, 317, 331-332, 369-370 (Tieri Te Tikao) and Native 
Land Court, Maketu Minute Book 16, 198 (Wiremu Maihi Ereatara). 
297  Ibid, 198. 
298  This rather hardened form of language to describe fluid and complex "claims" is briefly considered in Grant 
Young, above n 295, 259–260. For an interesting critical account see Lyndsay Head "Land, Authority and 
the Forgetting of Being in Early Colonial Māori History", above n 295. Also see Hickford Making 
"Territorial Rights of the Natives", above n 94, chapter three (for the 1840s). 
299  "Lake Rotorua Case 1918, Evidence" (1 November 1918) CL174/1, fos.322-323, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
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the applicants and long-standing Pākehā resident in the vicinity, had "been most innocent in not 
knowing anything about the elaborate plan prepared for the case but the Judge laughed at his 
innocence".300 Prendeville advised that Mair, "proceeded to show how the lake was actually divided 
up between the Hapus [sic] and how the fishing in each division was held by the Hapu and no other 
Hapu could cross this division of the land in the lake except by the permission of the owners."301 
The Crown Solicitor surmised that "in order to show how jealously they guarded their land in the 
lake they have to discredit the Tuhourangi - a hapū to the south of Rotorua township - Old Meta 
their chief gets uneasy under these slurs and may yet explode".302  Prendeville inclined to the view 
that the claim is clearly a ruse of the young generation for blackmail and they have worked up the 
old men under imaginary grievances".303 Tactically, Prendeville stated that the "trouble is to 
exercise the necessary patience to let them hang themselves".304 Under cross-examination by 
Prendeville on 30 October 1918, Mair did agree that the boundaries were "fishing boundaries" but 
added that "I said that they corresponded with the hinterland [boundaries of the hapū] generally 
speaking".305 Evidence regarding rahui in respect of the use of fisheries in the lakes constituted a 
part of his testimony.306 Mr Keys, an official of the Native Department and Native Land Court 
recorded in his diary for 26 October 1918 that Judge Wilson had "talked to me [on 23 October 1918] 
for quite a long time about the case; and (rather a peculiar thing for a Judge to do) told me that the 
Natives' case was well established".307 He also wrote that it "seems now that the Crown, in 
opposing the Maoris' claim, will rely to some extent of section 87 of 'The Native Land Act, 1909', 
and not only Wilson but also Earl, KC … thinks this section will have a most important bearing".308  
 
The claim to property in the lakebed was received as a capricious tactical move, representative 
of various inter-hapū and intra-hapū political preferences. Salmond suspected that the "Natives did 
not themselves claim to be the exclusive owners of Lake Rotorua and that they were not aware that 
they were the owners of this lake until Earl told them so".309 Keys noted on 26 October 1918 that 
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306  Ibid, 212-213. 
307  B Keys papers (26 October 1918) Ms Papers 0407 (Micro-0724), ATL, Wellington. 
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309  Salmond, to Prendeville, Crown Solicitor (24 October 1918) at 4, CL174/2, Archives, New Zealand, 
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"Mair is giving evidence at present, and Judge Wilson allows him the most extraordinary privilege 
of frequently explaining to the Maoris in Court what evidence he is giving, and even of receiving 
hints and reminders from them".310 In the presentation of the applicants' case on Lake Rotorua and 
Lake Rotoiti, repeated references were made to extracts from the minute books of earlier Native 
Land Court proceedings on the blocks of land surrounding the lakes.311 A number of witnesses had 
participated in earlier Native Land Court proceedings dealing with parcels of land bordering upon or 
in the vicinity of the lakes. For certain members of Te Arawa, then, the court located in the Waiariki 
district (based in Rotorua) and its processes would have had a degree of familiarity. The Presiding 
Judge generally dwelt within the locality. The issues before the court provided a construct in the 
formal contested space or site of legal proceedings through which the oral testimony and legal 
submissions would pass. Because the proceedings were contested, there was an oppositional format 
for the presentation of evidence argument. Counsel prepared pairs of opposed law speeches or 
submissions. Earl got to deliver his version.  
Salmond received extensive correspondence from the Crown Solicitor, Prendeville, describing 
the thread of Earl's argument in the Native Land Court at Rotorua. Hawthorne and Knight of the 
Department of Lands and Survey also ensured that a reporter was contracted to transcribe the 
proceedings of each day in preparation for the production of a typescript account.312 To this end, 
Hawthorne associated this technique with providing tactical space for the Crown Law Office to 
consider its response to the applicants' case in the Native Land Court in as reflective a fashion as 
possible. The transcribed reports would be mailed to Salmond in Wellington and would eventually 
  
310  B Keys papers (26 October 1918) Ms Papers 0407 (Micro-0724), ATL. He also recorded that "Mair's 
evidence, in English, is not interpreted to the Maoris, and his little speeches, in Maori, remain unexplained 
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forgotten something in Court. The whole conduct of the case is irregular, but no one seems to mind." I am 
indebted to Dr Ashley Gould for bringing this reference to my attention. 
311  "Lake Rotorua Case 1918, Evidence", 30 October 1918, CL174/1, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
312  See Hawthorne, Department of Lands and Survey, to Prendeville Crown Solicitor (5 October 1918) 
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the native side and then ask for an adjournment to enable the Crown to prepare its reply. Knight has 
arranged for a good man to take the evidence in shorthand and he and I arranged yesterday for the evidence 
to be transcribed in half-daily shifts, so that the morning's evidence will be typed by the following afternoon 
or evening and the afternoon evidence the following morning. This arrangement may perhaps render an 
adjournment unnecessary, as w[oul]d be able to go through the evidence each evening and be more or less 
prepared to deal with it at the end of the natives' case. But I think it w[oul]d be better to get an adjournment 
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before the reply of the Crown is given". Prendeville had written in the margin alongside this final statement: 
"yes if necessary". 
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be bound as a volume in the Crown Law Office.313 The logistical commitment illustrated the 
earnestness with which the Crown case was conducted before the Native Land Court. The service 
was made available to the Native Land Court itself and the applicant parties in the Rotorua hearing. 
Although the recording personnel changed in the course of the hearing on account of dissatisfaction 
with the quality of performance, the service remained active throughout the ten days the Native 
Land Court sat until the adjournment on 1 November 1918.314 It was intended that Salmond would 
deliver legal submissions for the Crown but the proceedings were adjourned on Friday, 1 November 
1918 and never re-convened on 4 December 1918, as was initially envisaged at the time of 
adjournment. The judge died in the notorious influenza epidemic of that year whilst Prendeville 
himself was afflicted, as was Hawthorne. Prendeville advised Earl on 27 November 1918 that he did 
not expect to be fit for the continuation of the litigation.315 Prendeville wrote to Earl on 5 February 
1919 seeking his agreement to an approach to the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court to arrange 
for a special fixture on a date "after the end of March".316 He confessed that, "As one or more of 
our staff will in turn be away on leave from now till the end of March it will be difficult for me to 
get back to Rotorua before April".317 There were delays to the re-commencement of the 
proceedings, both deliberate and otherwise. The interests of Ngāti Pikiao, a group within the Te 
Arawa confederation based in the vicinity of Lake Rotoiti, were increasingly thrust into the theatre 
of the negotiations concerning the re-activation of the proceedings. Tai Mitchell of Ngāti Te 
Takinga, a hapū of Ngāti Pikiao, sought to delay the resumption of the hearing. He was mindful of 
awaiting the results of the general election in 1919. Mitchell said to the Department of Lands and 
Survey official Knight, that, "If the present party I mean Massey's party is defeated and the liberal 
party gains the reins of Government I am very confident of a settlement being arrived at satisfactory 
to the Crown and the Natives."318 It was proposed, "therefore that I move at this end for the case not 
to be proceeded with prior to the General Election …".319 The Liberal Party did not, however, 
return to the Treasury benches. Tactical motivations were in play on all sides of the argument. As 
we shall see, Salmond's conception or that of the Crown Law Office under his leadership eventually 
prevailed in legislation addressing the "Arawa district lakes" in 1922.  
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The Native Land Court was understood to have "exclusive jurisdiction to investigate the title to 
customary land, to ascertain the relative shares of the owners, and to issue orders called "freehold 
orders", which [would] have the same effect as a Crown grant transforming that land into Native 
freehold land and vesting it for a legal estate in fee simple".320 Section 92 of the Native Land 
Act 1909 provided that on any investigation and determination of title to customary land, the Native 
Land Court would make a "freehold order" defining the area dealt with, naming the persons entitled 
to the area and specifying their relative interests in the land. Every "freehold order" would have the 
legal effect of vesting a legal estate in fee simple in possession in the named persons. Salmond was 
aware that the Native Land Act 1894 provided that all land still held under a certificate of title or 
under a memorial of ownership in respect of customary land as at the enactment of the 1894 statute 
would become subject to the Land Transfer Act system and in consequence the owners would 
acquire an indefeasible legal estate in fee simple.321 Treating the phrase "native title" in these 
circumstances as an analogue for statutorily recognised "customary land" within the meaning of 
section 2 of the Native Land Act 1909, the Crown Law Office under Salmond was prepared to argue 
the view that "native title" was "not universal".322 "If no claimant can prove his title it is not Native 
land at all."323 The sense was that the applicant would bear a probative onus to establish 
evidentially that the submerged land, otherwise vested in the Crown as its dominium,324 was "held 
… under the customs and usages of the Māori people" in view of Salmond's perception of the 
legislative definition of "customary land".  
 
On Salmond's account in 1918 (as in 1912-1914), only forms of Māori engagement with land 
comparable to proprietorship (or, in other words, legally and evidentially worthy of a finding 
 
320  See Salmond, explanatory memorandum, "The Native Land Act 1909: Introduction (Memorandum by the 
Solicitor-General)", in The Native Land Act, 1909 (issued at the direction of the Hon James Carroll, Native 
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321  A "memorial of ownership" described the form under section 47 of the Native Land Act 1873 that declared 
"the names of all persons" found to be "owners" of "customary land". The nomenclature of "certificate of 
title" was used in substitution for "memorial of ownership", for example, in the Native Land Court 
Act 1880. 
322  Crown Law Office, argument, "Rotorua Case" undated, 1918(?), CL174/2, at Archives New Zealand, 
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77-82. 
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conventional use of this term in Roman law. As Frame has noted in Southern Jurist, above n 1, 124-125, it 
was apparently used by Salmond in a marginal handwritten note on the transcript of the "Lake Rotorua" 
proceeding in the Native Land Court in 1918. It did not, however, materialise in an outline of his theory of 
imperium and dominium until the sixth edition of his Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (6 ed, Sweet 
and Maxwell Limited, London, 1920) when he added, as Appendix V, a section on "The Territory of the 
State" (see Salmond's preface to this edition). 
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tantamount to "rights of ownership") could properly form the subject of a freehold order. Where the 
evidence signified less than a relationship of "ownership", then a finding of non-territorial rights 
might be appropriate. "Ownership", according to the Crown argument prepared for the Rotorua 
Lakes case, involved "exclusive possession and use for all purposes".325 The proposed submission 
stated that, "[f]ishing rights and navigation rights are different from rights of ownership".326 
Salmond described the relevant concept of "ownership" in a letter of 24 October 1918 to the Crown 
solicitor representing the Crown in the Native Land Court in Rotorua, James Prendeville. "By a right 
of ownership", said Salmond, "is meant a right vested in defined persons to the occupation of the 
land to the exclusion of all other persons and to the use of the land for all persons".327 In this vein, 
according to the Solicitor-General, "Any right less than this and any non-exclusive right is not 
ownership".328 Salmond was certainly disappointed at the paucity of evidence on "public user". Yet, 
in this private correspondence, Salmond insisted that it was "not disputed by the Crown that the 
Natives have and always have had rights of fishing and navigation, in Rotorua and other inland 
lakes and waters".329 Furthermore, the Crown did not claim that the "public by prescription, grant or 
otherwise have obtained any legal right of navigation or fishery in such waters".330 He confirmed 
that, "What is contended by the Crown is that these rights are rights of user only and not rights of 
exclusive ownership such as exist in respect of dry land and that therefore they cannot be made the 
foundation of a freehold order".331 Elsewhere, he admitted that it could not "possibly be contended 
on behalf of the Crown that Native customary title is limited to dry land and does not include 
waters".332 Yet, he said that:333 
I should like to prove for example that all Tribes around Lake Rotorua have equal right of navigation 
over the whole Lake, but that rights of fishery are localised [-] distinct fishing grounds being 
appropriated to particular Hapus sub-Tribes or families. 
  
325  Crown Law Office, argument, "Rotorua Case" undated, 1918(?), CL174/2, 4, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
326  Ibid. 
327  Salmond to Prendeville (24 October 1918) CL174/2, 2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
328  Ibid, 4. 
329  Ibid, 1.  
330  Ibid. 
331  Ibid. 
332  Salmond to Under-secretary of Lands, "Lakes Rotorua and Waikaremoana" (11 June 1917) CL174/2, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
333  Salmond to Prendeville (24 October 1918) CL174/2, at 2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
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Counsel for the applicants anticipated this line of argument. In his examination-in-chief of 
Ereatara on 1 November 1918 in the Native Land Court hearing of the "Rotorua Lakes case", Earl 
enquired, rather leadingly, whether each hapū exclusively possessed, as a matter of fact, its 
particular division of Lake Rotorua. The witness responded affirmatively that it was indeed 
"exclusive possession". According to Ereatara, "If a hapu were seen rowing over another hapu's 
subdivision questions would be asked as to why they were rowing over it".334  He continued with 
the comment that, "If it were found that they were going over it for the purpose of working or laying 
claim to it the result would be a fight".335 The importance of affiliation to a certain descent group 
for particular purposes and at certain times was identified with Ereatara stating, "the only time they 
are allowed to go over these subdivisions is when, say Ngatirangiwewehi were going over the 
Ngatiwhakaue portion as a Ngatiwhakaue, or vice versa".336 When queried about the degree to 
which hapū had historically accommodated the presence of Pākehā strangers in the area of Lake 
Rotorua and Lake Rotoiti, Ereatara replied that the "Maoris made no objection to them going over 
the lake, because the Maoris thought they came here just for the purposes of sight-seeing, and to see 
the lake".337 Earl also sought to rely upon the recent practice of elements of the Crown to acquire 
(through purchase) parcels of land that included lakes in the vicinity of the settlement at Rotorua. 
One illustration was Lake Opouri (or Ngāpouri). In addition Prendeville advised Salmond that 
several lakes (including Ōkataina, Ōkareka, and Rotokakahi) had formed parts of blocks already 
subject to orders of the Native Land Court.  Salmond, however, cautioned Prendeville against 
accepting this as having any significance. "These purchases", said Salmond, "were the purchases of 
all Native rights over the locus in quo irrespective of whether these rights were of ownership or 
rights of fisheries".338 He regarded the former Native Land Court orders (and the recent Lake 
Waikaremoana order) embracing lakes as "immaterial" as the "very question now in issue is whether 
these orders were or were not properly made".339  
VII THE TREATY AS A SOURCE FOR UNDERSTANDING CLAIMS TO 
NATIVE TITLE RIGHTS 
The developing Crown Law Office approach to customary interests was not a perspective 
derived from the recognition of justiciable common law rights or even a specifically common-law 
source for according legal recognition to the property rights of Māori. In 1917 Salmond commented 
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that, "Native customary title depends for its existence on the Treaty of Waitangi as recognised and 
validated as a ground of legal title by the successive Acts dealing with Native land".340 In a critical 
passage, Salmond opined that the, "extent of Native title depends therefore on the true construction 
of that Treaty and of the validating legislation".341 "This", said the Solicitor-General, "depends on 
the expressed or implied intention of the grantor, namely the Crown and Parliament".342 Thus, in 
citing the favourable decision of Waipapakura v Hempton in his 1917 legal opinion to the Under-
Secretary of Lands, Salmond supposed that the "Supreme Court has held that it was not intended to 
include tidal waters", such as the "harbours, foreshores and tidal rivers of New Zealand".343 
Salmond confessed that, "Neither the Treaty nor the statute contain any express exception of such 
waters but this exception has had to be implied on the ground that it would be unreasonable to 
presume an intention on the part of the Crown and the Legislature to destroy the public rights of 
navigation and access to the sea".344 He analogised the implied constraint applied through the 
interpretative thread of the common law with that which applied to Crown grants pursuant to section 
35 of the Crown Grants Act 1908:345 
Just as a Crown grant described as bounded by the sea goes only to high water mark, so the statutory 
grant on which Native title depends has had the same implied limit imposed upon it.  
"Even therefore", continued Salmond,346 
[I]f it could be proved that by Native custom the Wellington Harbour was the subject of exclusive 
private ownership, this customary ownership has acquired no legal recognition or validity and no 
freehold order could be obtained in respect of such waters.  
This reflected a mature rendition of a Crown theory, as interpreted by the Solicitor-General, 
against the background of his experience with the drafting of the Native Land Act 1909 and his 
participation as senior counsel for the Crown in Tamihana Korokai in 1912 and Waipapakura v 
Hempton in 1914.  
Here, then, was a strand of a legalistically expressed Crown idiom or register with interpretative 
consequences premised not upon common law sources but upon the articles of the Treaty of 
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Waitangi and on divining the proper intention of the various legislative regimes that had specifically 
addressed "native land". This approach was entwined with assumptions concerning the common law 
protection of public rights (jus publicum), especially rights of navigation and fishing. As such, he 
concluded that "[t]his Treaty and legislation amounts in effect to a statutory grant from the Crown to 
the Natives and the question is what are the limits and bounds of this statutory grant".347 As counsel 
to the Law Drafting Office in 1909, Salmond stated that, "[c]ustomary land, since it has never been 
Crown-granted, belongs to the Crown".348 It accordingly fell, in his opinion, within the broad sense 
of "Crown land" as a term,349 
[S]ubject, however, to the right of those natives who by virtue of Māori custom have a claim to it to 
obtain a Crown grant (or a certificate of title under the Land Transfer Act in lieu of Crown grant) on the 
ascertainment of their customary titles of the Native Land Court.  
Hence the handwritten marginal note (attributed to Salmond) on the Crown Law Office's version 
of the transcribed record of Earl's oral argument before the Native Land Court in Rotorua on 
16 October 1918: "[The Crown] acquired whole dominium subject to Native proved titles".350 This 
concise remark expressed part of the inner core of Salmond's theoretical and evidential approach. It 
was expressed in opposition to Earl's proposition that under the Treaty of Waitangi, "nothing passes 
to the Crown … but the Sovereignty, no territory whatever, nothing of value, with the exception of 
the sovereignty under the Treaty".351 As such, the "Crown acquired no territorial title whatever, the 
Crown acquired nothing but what could be voluntarily ceded to the Crown or purchased." Indeed, 
"everything else so far as the North Island was concerned remains in the Natives".352 From the 
perspective of the Crown's official appreciation of the then accessible jurisprudence in the ordinary 
courts, such a suggestion would have been treated as an unwelcome novelty, although the 
correspondence internal to the Crown suggests that certain of its legal advisors and officials were 
not completely unfamiliar with the possibility of such a stance. Certainly, Hawthorne had 
anticipated that legal counsel for the applicants would adopt this line of presumed Māori ownership 
in the Native Land Court. Unsurprisingly, the risk of failure in the courts was acutely appreciated 
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even though the outcome was not perceived to be particularly palatable from a public policy 
standpoint. 
In litigating the meaning of native land legislation, Salmond, resorted to a theory of the Crown 
as to the place of the Treaty of Waitangi and native title in relation to a conception of the "public 
interest", a notoriously fluid concept. In this vein, the legal intervention of the Crown could both 
reflect and escalate the perceived significance of certain proceedings, whether in the Native Land 
Court or the ordinary courts. The Crown's decision to contest the claims of members of certain Te 
Arawa hapū, in the "Rotorua Lakes case" in 1918, proved to be a case in point. The "public interest" 
was understood, in part, as connoting the concept of the jus publicum or ius publicum. In his 
capacity as a jurist, Salmond had described the jus publicum in the context of a specific legal maxim 
– privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat.353 Against this background, he cited the eastern 
Roman or Byzantine source the Digest or Pandects of the Emperor Justinian and opined that:354 
By jus publicum is here meant that part of the law which concerns the public interest, and which for this 
reason the agreements of private persons cannot be allowed to infringe upon. 
In the Lakes proceedings, Salmond desired, "if possible to obtain a decision in favour of the 
Crown on the ground that the navigable waters of this country never did belong to the Natives".355 
That is, the public law of the Crown would carve out a legal space (populated by public rights of 
navigation and fishery, for instance) that could not be touched by private law rights unless 
legislation granted otherwise. Crown proprietorship was perceived in policy and legal terms as a 
guarantor of such space against the possibility of localised non-Crown control of the relevant space. 
In 1914 Salmond also expressed concern to the Local Bills select committee that the vesting of 
additional tidal lands in the Auckland Harbour Board by local legislation would compromise the 
public rights of navigation and fishing, as well as recreational activities. Solicitors for the Auckland 
Harbour Board contested this opinion but the context is suggestive of Salmond's general 
approach.356 The denouement of the litigation in the "Rotorua Lakes case" also revealed the 
government's claims to sort out in the political realm when and where the Crown might be insulated 
from the consequences of undesirable court action. Frame has noted in passing the practical 
motivations underlying government's preference for dealing with Māori politically rather than 
  
353  John Salmond Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (Steven and Haynes, London, 1902) 384. 
354  Ibid. In this specialized use of the concept of the jus publicum, Salmond said further that, "Agreements 
which in this way overpass the limits allowed by the law are said in a wide sense to be illegal, or to be void 
for illegality. They may or may not be illegal in a narrower sense, as amounting in their making or in their 
performance to a criminal and or civil wrong." See also Salmond Jurisprudence or the Theory of the Law (3 
ed, Steven & Haynes, London, 1910) 317. 
355  Salmond to Prendeville (24 October 1918) CL174/2, 4, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
356  Russell and Campbell to Secretary, Auckland Harbour Board (2 December 1914) M1 4/40, A4, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington. 
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judicially.357 Vitally, however, Salmond believed the law supplied a theoretical fillip to this 
approach on account of the Treaty as a source of claims to rights that might not be recognised 
(unless legislative recognition were accorded to those rights).  
VIII A CROWN THEORY AND POLITICAL OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENT 
SECURED IN LEGISLATION 
The preferred legal register or vocabulary of the Crown on the Treaty of Waitangi, and 
customary rights, insofar as there was one, could be expressed in legislation and insulated from 
unwelcome litigation to an extent. If legislated, it would be secured in the non-litigated parts of 
governmental work for the life of the legislation or, more precisely, the life of the awareness and 
memory of the theory or perhaps theories amongst officials and politicians. That official awareness 
could be very ephemeral indeed, not least of all because the paper record of the day-to-day press of 
government policy and legal work is seldom reflective. It is often contested and is pulled in 
directions responsive to issues of the moment and the demands of policy.358 Salmond was evidently 
in earnest with his approach to developing what could be properly characterised as a Crown-based 
theory on the Treaty of Waitangi and the Māori land issue that could be applied consistently and 
could cast a measure of coherence across what might be referred to as governmental law. Having 
participated in the drafting of the Native Land Act 1909, he had already distilled a theoretical map 
of sorts to navigate the legislation, as revealed in his three memoranda accompanying the Bill as it 
proceeded through the legislature.359 In looking backwards at the case law and previous native land 
legislation, he was also, Janus-like, looking forwards and seeking to embed a degree of theoretical 
coherence and consistency to the government's legal approach. As the second (and non-political law 
officer)360 he would have some traction. He did become familiar, nevertheless, with the conceptual 
and evidential vulnerability of the executive branch's preferred legal view vis-à-vis the class of 
"customary land" recognised statutorily under the Native Land Act 1909. 
In 1922 Salmond's theory on the Treaty of Waitangi and the Crown's proprietary entitlement to 
large navigable lakes would persist in a particular piece of legislation expressing an out-of-court 
settlement on fourteen Arawa or Rotorua district lakes, including Rotorua, Rotoiti, Ōkareka, 
  
357  Frame Salmond: Southern Jurist, above n 1, 114-115. 
358  Assuming that the "register" or "theory" ever gets to be litigated, courts might not, of course, necessarily 
share the preferred official view of chosen words in any given piece of legislation. 
359  Salmond "Native Land Bill [1909]: Memorandum: Notes on the History of Native-land Legislation", printed 
at the front of the Native Land Bill, 1909, Nos 87-1, 87-2 and 87-3, Bill Books, 1909, Parliamentary 
Counsel Office, Wellington. 
360  On the legal role of the Solicitor-General, see J McGrath "Principles for Sharing Law Officer Power: The 
Role of the New Zealand Solicitor-General" (1998) 18 NZULR 197. 
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Ōkataina, Tarawera, Rotomā, Ngāpouri (Opouri), and Rotomahana.361 Section 27 of the Native 
Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1922 "declared" the beds of the lakes, 
"together with right to use the waters of the said lakes, … to be the property of the Crown, freed and 
discharged from the Native customary title, if any".362 There was, accordingly, an agreement to 
disagree as to the possibility of native title subsisting in the lakebeds. If any such title did exist, it 
was treated as extinguished at law by virtue of the particular form of the statutory vesting. The rights 
of the "natives" to "fish for and catch for their own use any indigenous fish in any of the said lakes" 
were "reserved" in section 27(2) of the statute. No such fish were to be sold, except with the consent 
of the Arawa District Trust Board constituted under section 27(4) of the legislation. 
On 12 May 1920, the Minister of Lands, D G Guthrie, instructed Prendeville, then based at the 
Crown Law Office in Wellington, to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the 
"Natives interested". The Minister indicated that he would be prepared to "agree to granting free 
fishing rights to the Natives without license [sic], or interference by Rangers, provided that the fish 
is used for their own consumption and is not sold, and provided also that it is not taken out of 
season".363 As for title, the relevant members of Te Arawa would "abandon their claims to the bed 
of the Lake, admitting the Crown's title to the same subject to any fishing rights reserved in the 
Treaty of Waitangi". Subsequently, on 22 May 1920, Guthrie would telegram Ngata, acting as one 
of the principal negotiators for the political and legal settlement of the lakes claim, that "the only 
basis of negotiation for settlement could be that the right to the bed of the lakes is sufficiently 
doubtful both to claimants and Crown as to be subject of reasonable compromise".364 The Attorney-
General, Francis Bell, had advised Cabinet in a memorandum of 21 March 1922 that he was, 
"confident of the law if the point could be decided by a Court of Law", as opposed to the Native 
Land Court.365 Bell observed that, "[b]y the Treaty of Waitangi the whole fee simple of the lands of 
New Zealand became vested in the Crown, subject to the Native right".366 In Bell's account, "[t]he 
  
361  I do not examine the negotiations in detail here although I believe that they still require a careful history. For 
accounts to date see: White, "Inland Waterways: Lakes"; Tania Thompson "Interim Report – Rotorua Lakes 
Research" (5 March 1993) report for O'Sullivan Clemens Briscoe and Hughes (held by the Office of Treaty 
Settlements, Wellington); "Rotorua Lakes Report" Research Unit, Manatū Māori, Wellington, February 
1990. These last two reports are referred to in White. 
362  Emphasis added. 
363  D G Guthrie, Minister of Lands, to Prendeville, Crown Solicitor, Crown Law Office (12 May 1920) 
CL174/2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.  
364  Guthrie to Ngata (22 May 1920) ABWN 8925 W5278 Box 76226.5 pt b, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. 
365  Bell, memorandum for Cabinet, "separate and strictly confidential", 21 March 1922, MA1 W2459, box 49, 
5/13/242 pt 4, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. This memorandum can be located in the Department of 
Native Affairs file referred to along with several of John Salmond's opinions, including Salmond to 
Attorney-General (4 November 1912). 
366  Ibid. 
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Native right in respect of those waters [the beds of the so-called Arawa district lakes] was the 
exclusive user by certain tribes and hapus [sic], but as in the case of the shores of the sea and the 
navigable rivers of New Zealand, the bed of the waters was in no sense vested in the tribes and 
hapus [sic], which have the rights over the waters".367 
As with Salmond, Bell was concerned that, "[t]he contrary view confuses the question of the 
Māori rights, which is a matter of custom determinable by the Native Land Court, with the legal 
result in England of ownership of fishing rights and marginal occupation".368 He advised his 
ministerial colleagues that the "Supreme Court [sic; the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai v 
Solicitor-General] has decided that the question of the ownership of the bed of the Lakes is a 
question for the Native Land Court".369 In consequence, the Attorney-General averred that the 
question of proprietorship of inland waters was, "not to be determined as a matter of law which 
lawyers could advise upon, but as a matter which the Native Land Court can determine absolutely 
subject only to the Native Appellate Court".370 Given that the specialist court of first instance on 
Māori "customary land" would have pronounced on evidence, Bell considered it "improbable", and 
therefore imprudent, to rely upon the possibility of the Privy Council reversing "the decision of the 
Native Appellate Court on the question of the extent of Native rights under the Treaty of 
Waitangi".371 With a view to persuading Cabinet to accept a settlement with representatives of Te 
Arawa, Bell was aware that the recent decision of Judge Gilfedder in the Native Land Court 
concerning Lake Waikaremoana had favoured the finding of a lake bed as customary land. He 
regarded the Waikaremoana precedent as "extremely serious", as "the result of granting the fee 
simple of the bed to the Natives would raise very serious question[s] as to the right to withdraw 
water from the lake for electrical power purposes".372 Because it was a specific instance, the theory 
was treated as applying in a particular politically negotiated space rather than generically throughout 
New Zealand although the Crown "register" would continue to apply as the executive branch's 
internal interpretative view as to the content of the pertinent law.373 
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373  Further careful legal historical work is required to chart its subsequent course and any changes to it over 
time. 
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IX CONCLUSION – TOWARDS WRITING CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIES OF 
THE CROWN AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
This study has charted the nuances of a Crown legal "register", language or way of speaking 
about the Treaty of Waitangi and "native title" during the service of Salmond as Solicitor-General. It 
has revealed a complex approach to "native title" and the Treaty of Waitangi and its contested place 
within public law and inside the Crown itself. It has done so through examining the documentary 
record internal to government, especially the interaction between departments in the response to 
litigation on native land questions. Importantly, this essay illuminates the possibilities of exploring a 
constitutional history of the Treaty internal to the Crown, as much as one external to it. Within the 
Crown, the Treaty of Waitangi was seen as the political source for Māori claims to the legal 
recognition of rights in statutory regimes (such as the Fisheries Act 1908 or the native land 
legislation). Salmond saw customary native title as a mere normative claim (rather than a legally 
actionable right) arising under the Treaty of Waitangi. It was a claim to have a Crown grant issue in 
particular circumstances and recognised in legislation. English common law sources were used to 
constrain the interpretative scope and practical reach of the Treaty of Waitangi. These common law 
sources would also outline the specific circumstances that would yield a judicial finding in favour of 
customary land status and a subsequent Crown grant. Tidal waters, for instance, were precluded 
from the recognised scope of a claim to customary title under the Treaty. The common law, 
however, was not viewed as supplying the ordinary courts with power to determine whether land 
(submerged or otherwise) was subject to native title. The claims to such interests were construed as 
Treaty-based claims tied to a specific statutory structure and a specialist Native Land Court. The 
ordinary courts might consider whether customary fisheries were recognised statutorily but the 
Native Land Court enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction on "native land". In 1922, in the wake of the 
politically negotiated compromise of litigation, legislation was used to secure a preferred legal 
position of the Crown in relation to navigable lakes and to insulate it from further litigation. 
Salmond's legal stance provided a theoretical as much as a pragmatic foundation for this sort of 
arrangement. Furthermore, his approach expressly introduced the analytical conception of territorial 
and non-territorial rights to New Zealand (with customary fishing rights under the fisheries 
legislation being construed as "non-territorial") but these categories would be subjected to different 
perspectives in the nascent scholarship of Paul McHugh in 1984 and in the decision of Te Weehi 
in 1986.  
While approaching the question of a Crown "register" or language via Salmond and the Crown 
Law Office, the argument has sought to present the understanding and production of views on 
public law within the Crown as part of a complex interaction amongst departments and Ministers 
themselves. By isolating a strand of legal reasoning and language within the Crown, mapping its 
actual deployment in litigation and in discussions both internal and external to the executive branch 
of government, this article has revealed a distinctive and sophisticated set of voices and 
conversations that suffuse a part of New Zealand's past. 
